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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• ‘Clothes, Chocolate and Children: Realising the Transparency 
Dividend’ ran from March 2018 to February 2019 and examined 
the effects of new requirements on businesses operating in the UK 
(introduced under the Modern Slavery Act, 2015) on exploitation in 
supply chains using a comparative research design,
• We focused on two sectors – cocoa and garments - where there 
are well-known issues around exploitation and child labour. We 
conducted fieldwork in four case study countries - Bangladesh, the 
Dominican Republic, Ghana and Myanmar - and spoke to over 250 
workers and stakeholders. Data was also gathered in the UK via 
collection and analysis of corporate Modern Slavery statements and 
interviews with large firms. 
• Our goal was to find out how transparency requirements connect 
with the reality of working conditions in source countries, and we 
were particularly interested in effects on children in the workplace 
and workers’ families in the two sectors. 
• In this project we sought to explore issues on the continuum of 
labour exploitation because many problematic practices and 
experiences in work are the abuses in-between forced labour or 
slavery-like conditions and full compliance.
• Our findings paint a picture of supply chains characterized by 
poverty, poor working conditions and business models which 
negatively impact workers’ experiences. 
• In the garment sector in Myanmar and Bangladesh, we found 
consistent patterns of overwork, under-payment, insults and abuse 
and a lack of responsible engagement by buyers. This is within a 
context of a failure to implement labour laws and hostility towards 
worker organising, for example through trade unions. It is evident 
that, without addressing these dual factors, problematic working 
conditions will not be resolved in a sustainable, long-term way. 
• Despite high-profile ‘anti-slavery’ activities carried out by major 
brands in garment supply chains, there is limited reference to the 
enhancement and responsible enforcement of local labour laws as 
part of this work. We argue that the UK government has a pivotal 
role to play in focusing overseas development work on supporting 
efforts to ensure the coverage and enforcement of labour law.
• In the cocoa sector in Ghana and the Dominican Republic, our 
research identified some key misconceptions of how ‘child labour’ 
is framed and understood, with a lack of understanding of the 
situation faced by child workers and other risks for the sector. 
These include: sustainability of cocoa farming in the context of an 
ageing farmer population; intergenerational livelihood training and 
land ownership; safety of children; economic needs for children 
aged 16 and 17; and a livelihood model that does not include the 
hiring of paid labourers outside the family unit.
• We argue that the ultimate goal of efforts to prevent child labour 
and exploitation of child workers from taking place in cocoa farming 
must be centred on the rights of the child, including the voices 
and views of children and recognition of their presence in farming. 
It should enhance and promote the livelihoods of cocoa workers 
(farmers and labourers) and their families. Above all, initiatives 
should do no harm to those they seek to protect.
• To conclude, we found little cause for optimism in terms of the 
capacity of the new transparency requirement to deliver on its aims. 
Increased transparency may help in shining a spotlight on poor 
working practices, but the scope of that enlightenment is limited 
and highly uneven. 
• Of particular concern are the unforeseen consequences of Modern 
Slavery (and other) transparency-related legislation, and corporate 
social responsibility agendas. These may displace rather than solve 
problematic working practices for children, and they may push 
exploitation and modern slavery further down the supply chain into 
less regulated markets. Future research needs to concentrate on 
these darker areas, where it is likely that children’s and workers’ 
rights are further reduced and the risks of exploitation are high.
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INTRODUCTION
This report examines the impacts of new requirements on businesses 
brought in by the UK’s ‘modern slavery’ agenda. The research offers 
new insights into the way the transparency agenda affects the welfare 
of children, both directly, as workers in their own right, and indirectly, as 
the children of workers employed in these sectors. 1 
Our project examined supply chains for one commodity (cocoa) 
and one manufactured good (garments) and we looked at working 
conditions in four low and middle-income countries that form a 
significant part of these supply chains. We selected these case 
studies on the basis that they represent a mix of both established and 
emerging production: Bangladesh and Myanmar (garments), Dominican 
Republic and Ghana (cocoa). 
Between March 2018 and February 2019, we carried out research 
that included analysis of a sample of UK companies’ Modern Slavery 
statements, interviews with UK-based companies in these sectors, and 
fieldwork in each of the countries including interviews and focus groups 
with workers (including children) and stakeholders about the working 
conditions in these sectors. Rather than looking for - or attempting 
to quantify - how many workers might be experiencing conditions 
categorised as ‘modern slavery’ (MS), we sought to explore issues 
around working conditions and governance in these supply chains. 
Our goal was to evaluate what, if any, impact the UK transparency 
agenda might be having on working conditions ‘upstream’. Unlike 
other similar research projects, we chose to focus on how this might be 
affecting children in different ways: children as workers, children who 
are displaced or excluded from work as a result of tighter regulation, 
and children whose parents are part of the workforce. The report is a 
summary of the project. 
1  For CCC Project Objectives see Appendix A
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SECTION 1 – DEFINITIONS AND CONTEXT
Project Definitions
Transparency
The concept of transparency in relation to supply chains does not 
have a fixed definition. It is underpinned by the idea that businesses 
should be open about where their products come from and how they 
are produced, including whose labour is involved in making them. 
The basic idea is that, by improving the visibility of who is involved 
in the supply of goods and products to businesses, where they are 
and how they operate, both workers and consumers will have greater 
opportunities to hold businesses to account. At its optimum, this 
would be across every ‘tier’ of production, for example in relation 
to food this would be possible at every level through from the farm 
to the supermarket, every stage of production (i.e. from producer 
to consumer) and in relation to manufacturing would also include 
final assembly (i.e. subcontractors and producers of supply inputs). 
Transparency is something shaped through practice, but also through 
legislation and policy. 
From a legal perspective, ‘Transparency in Supply Chains’ (TISC) is 
addressed in Section 54 of the UK’s Modern Slavery Act 2015 (MSA). 
Here, the notion is utilised as a tool to encourage businesses to 
disclose information about their supply chains, and what steps they are 
taking to ensure that ‘modern slavery’ does not feature in them. The 
legislation mandates companies with a turnover of £36 million or more 
and conducting business or a part of its business in the UK to publish 
an annual ‘slavery and human trafficking statement’ to describe the 
steps taken during the preceding financial year to ensure that slavery 
and human trafficking are not taking place in any part of its business or 
supply chains. 
Although the government has published guidance as to what should be 
included in a statement2, the business can ultimately select the content 
and form of the statement, even satisfying its transparency obligation 
under the MSA with a statement that the organisation ‘has taken 
no such steps’.3   Since the MSA became law and the transparency 
clause came into effect its value and effectiveness has been the 
2  See Transparency in Supply Chains: a Practical Guide for Organisation (October 2015). This is now recommended to be mandatory by the Independent MSA Review’s interim report on TISC 
(2019)
3  See Modern Slavery Act 2015 s54 (4)(b). The Independent MSA Review’s interim report on TISC has recommended the removal of this section (Field, Miller and Butler-Sloss, 2019)
4  See Seeing Through Transparency: Making Corporate Accountability Work for Workers (FLEX, 2018) https://www.labourexploitation.org/publications/seeing-through-transparency-making-
corporate-accountability-work-workers and #GoTransparent campaign win: Primark publishes factory locations (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2018)
5  See Transparency and value chain sustainability (Mol, 2015)
6  See Governance gaps in eradicating forced labor: From global to domestic supply chains (Crane et al, 2017)
7  See Fashion Transparency Index (Fashion Revolution, 2018)
8  Fashion Revolution, 2018: 3
9  See for example, research into campaign by Swedish company Nudie Jeans which found main effect was increased consumer demand (Egels-Zanden and Hansson 2016).
10  United Nations Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, signed 25th September, 1926 
11  See for example Slavery in its Contemporary Manifestations (Bales, 2013)
12  Slavery in its Contemporary Manifestations (Quirk, 2011)
13  Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law (Chuang 2014)
subject of much debate. Calls to strengthen its impact, for example 
by strengthening the guidance, and companies’ accountability4, have 
intensified. Transparency is clearly high on the public, political and 
research agendas in national and global environmental politics and 
governance.5 It has been pointed out that increased transparency alone 
is unlikely to improve working conditions or address modern slavery 
unless it is accompanied by a focus on gaps in governance.6
Many efforts driven by industry and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), particularly in the garment sector, have pinpointed 
transparency as a means of improving sustainability. The Fashion 
Transparency Index, for example, assesses and ranks brands and 
retailers across a range of indicators.7 The latest report claims that 
transparency is ‘like water… seeping into some of the darkest corners, 
permeating the fabric of the industry’ with the potential to flow into 
‘every deep nook and crevice, reshaping everything in its path’.8 
Despite widespread enthusiasm for transparency as a means of 
addressing problematic working conditions, however, research into 
industry-driven initiatives has found mixed results.9
Modern Slavery
The term modern slavery or modern-day slavery has long been used 
as a way to advocate for action against severe forms of exploitation. 
Until the UK’s Modern Slavery Act (MSA), however, there was no 
legal jurisdiction which defined the term. By contrast slavery has 
been defined in several pieces of international law, with one common 
reference being the 1926 Convention10 which defined slavery as “the 
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised” (Art 1). 
More recently commentators and politicians have added ‘modern’ or 
‘modern-day’ to both differentiate between contemporary and historical 
forms of slavery11 and as an attempt to inspire action - a rhetorical ‘call 
to arms’.12 The success with which this terminology has been adopted is 
illustrated by the fact that forced labour and trafficking in human beings 
(THB), which have distinct, albeit overlapping, definitions enshrined 
in international agreements and treaties, are increasingly subsumed 
under the term of modern slavery.13 This ‘turn’ to modern slavery as 
an umbrella term has been criticised by those who believe it devalues 
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the potency of slavery as an idea.14 Others are concerned all these 
terms for describing exploitation are open to manipulation by actors 
to obscure and even harden existing structural inequalities in society.15 
Nevertheless, the introduction of a requirement for companies to 
produce ‘slavery and human trafficking’ statements has had the effect 
of making businesses talk about working conditions in their supply 
chains. 
The MSA defines modern slavery as including the offences of Slavery, 
Servitude and Forced or Compulsory Labour and Human Trafficking. 
This raises a problem of conceptual confusion with each term having 
a different relationship with the others. For example, human trafficking 
(as defined by the Palermo Protocol) incorporates number of different 
trafficking types, including forced labour and domestic servitude. 
Moreover, there are differences in interpretation between countries and 
civil society actors using the term modern slavery, particularly when 
groups supporting sex workers’ rights clash with neo-abolitionists who 
see all sex work as trafficking.16 
In the rest of this report, when we refer to modern slavery it is the 
definition used in the MSA – i.e. covering a range of different offences 
and types of severe exploitation.  However, we make no assumption 
that this definition should be accepted uncritically or should be 
adopted at the international level. On the contrary, we note that due 
to the novelty, complexity (and national specificity) of the definitional 
landscape, use of the term modern slavery leaves many questions 
unanswered. Conceptual ambiguity makes it challenging for businesses 
to create reliable and consistent measures or benchmarks with which 
to assess performance. Differences of definition across borders also 
creates obstacles for transnational campaigns in favour of improved 
conditions for workers. The language of slavery or modern slavery 
does not have the same resonance across the world, and indeed may 
be counter-productive for efforts to combat labour exploitation in the 
global economy.17
The relationship between the terms ‘modern slavery’ and ‘child labour’ 
further complicates the issue. Organisations such as the ILO make a 
clear distinction between child slavery and child labour, but recently 
released reports on both issues simultaneously in the same press 
release to underline the connections. Others choose to combine them 
in other ways.18 The Sustainable Development Goals are notable in 
this regard: under SDG 8 (Decent Work) both modern slavery and child 
labour are included together under target 8.7.
14  Trafficking, Gender and Slavery: Past and Present (Patterson, 2013)
15  See New slavery, old binaries: human trafficking and the borders of ‘freedom’ (O’Connell Davidson, 2010)
16  See ‘The Multiplicity of Truths About Human Trafficking: Beyond ‘The Sex Slave’ Discourse’ (Tomkinson, 2012) and also the example of US position on illegal international adoptions (Turner, 2014)
17  See Eight reasons why we shouldn’t use the term ‘modern slavery’ (Dottridge, 2017)
18  For example the Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking (OCFT) in the US Dept of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB)
19  A child is defined as anyone under the age of 18 years old (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, Article 1)
20  The International Labour Organisation Convention No. 138 on the minimum age for admission to employment and work (1973); The International Labour Organisation Convention No. 182 on the 
worst forms of child labour, 1999; ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 1998; The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 32)
21  Extracted from Transparency in Supply Chains etc. A Practical Guide, (Home Office, 2017: 18) 
22  See International Labour Office, 2012; 2012a
Children and Child Labour
We are particularly interested in the experiences and rights of children 
in the context of labour supply chains and transparency requirements19. 
The international community, by virtue of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG 8.7 and 16.2), has expressed a renewed commitment 
to eliminating all forms of child labour by 2025. But such ambitions 
belie the contested nature of children’s working conditions and 
rights, the diversity of children’s labour experiences and conditions 
and the complexity of legal and policy responses at international and 
domestic level.20 Such nuances are reflected in the practical guidance 
accompanying the MSA:
The term “child labour” is often defined as work that deprives 
children of their childhood, their potential and their dignity, and 
that is harmful to physical and mental development. Whether or 
not particular forms of “work” can be called “child labour” depends 
on the child’s age, the type and hours of work performed, the 
conditions under which it is performed and the objectives pursued 
by individual countries. Children can be particularly vulnerable to 
exploitation, but child labour will not always constitute modern 
slavery. It will still be necessary to determine whether, based on 
the facts of the case, the children in question are being exploited 
in such a way as to constitute slavery, servitude and forced or 
compulsory labour or human trafficking. For example, it is possible 
for children to undertake some ‘light work’ which would not 
necessarily constitute modern slavery. ‘Light work’ is defined by 
article 7 of ILO Convention No. 138. Children do have particular 
vulnerabilities which should be considered when determining 
whether modern slavery is taking place. The Modern Slavery Act 
2015 specifically recognises that it is not necessary for a child to 
have been forced, threatened or deceived into their situation for it 
to be defined as exploitation.21
To confront these complexities, our research aimed not merely to 
record the presence and experience of children as workers in the 
supply chain; it also sought to capture what happens to children 
once they are excluded from working in these sectors, including the 
alternative opportunities available to them. We also wanted to explore 
the effects that parents’ working conditions have on children and 
family life more generally.22 In that sense, we seek to move beyond a 
purely protectionist, abolitionist narrative, and offer a more critically 
enriched picture of children’s needs, opportunities and entitlement in 
this context.
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Differentiating between ‘child labour’ and ‘child worker’
A significant number of children’s rights commentators23 support 
the need for a more nuanced, flexible and proportionate regulatory 
response to children who work. Therefore, this report approaches the 
subjects of child labour and child work as distinct but interconnected 
issues. For the purposes of the Modern Slavery Act and Transparency 
requirements, ‘child labour’ is defined in the light of international law24 
and is characterised by the following: 
• children below 12 years working in any economic activities; 
• children aged 12-14 engaged in more than light work; and 
• all children engaged in the worst forms of child labour. 
The worst forms of child labour are defined by article 3 of ILO 
Convention No. 182 as: 
a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale 
and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or 
compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of 
children for use in armed conflict; 
b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the 
production of pornography or for pornographic performances; 
c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in 
particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in 
the relevant international treaties; 
d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried 
out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 
explicitly prohibits exploitative child labour (Article 32). 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from 
economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely 
to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be 
harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or 
social development.
2. States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to ensure the implementation of the present 
article. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of 
other international instruments, States Parties shall in particular:
(a) Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for admission to 
employment; 
(b) Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of 
employment; 
(c) Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure 
the effective enforcement of the present article.
23  O’Connell Davidson (2011) views the construction of ‘child labour’ as a moral category, to be eliminated irrespective of its effects on the lives of children (see Bourdillon, 2007; Liebel, 2004; 
Mortimer, 2003; Zelizer, 2005)
24  ILO Convention No. 138 on the minimum age for admission to employment and work, 1973; ILO Convention No. 182 on the worst forms of child labour, 1999;  The United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 1989, Article 32. Note that Bangladesh and Myanmar have not ratified Convention No. 138. Ghana, Dominican Republic, Myanmar and Bangladesh have all ratified ILO 
Convention 182. 
25  Allowed to undertake dangerous work from 18 years old
26  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) was adopted in 1990 and came into force in 1999 to address the perceived western-centric, imperialistic bent of the CRC and to 
respond to the specific issues affecting children in Africa. This includes the duty on children ‘to work for the cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, superiors and elders at all times and to 
assist them in case of need’. Available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Education/Training/Compilation/Pages/2AfricanCharterontheRightsandWelfareoftheChild(1990).aspx
27  Ghana Children Act 1998 allows children to do ‘light’ work from aged 13
28  Factories Act, 2016 states children aged 14 and 15 can work a maximum of 4 hours per day
29  Part time work – exclusions for child models, actors and entertainers. Full time work only from 16 years of age, child must also attend part time education or training until the age of 18. 
Table 1 below illustrates the UNCRC ratification status of each of the 
countries involved in this Project and the domestic law in place to 
address the requirements of Article 32.
Table 1: Case study country ratification of 1989 UNCRC and legal working age.
Country 1989 UNCRC Legal Working Age
BANGLADESH Ratified 1990 1425
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Ratified 1991 14
GHANA Ratified 199026 1527
MYANMAR Ratified 1991 1428
UK Ratified 1991 1329
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Any discussion of children’s position within cocoa and garment 
supply chains can also be located within a broader discussion of the 
domestic economic and policy situation relating to the objectives of 
SDG 8, ‘Decent Work’ (promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work 
for all). We know that much of the global cultivation of raw materials, 
and an increasing proportion of manufacturing and production of 
consumer goods is located in low and middle-income countries where 
legislation around environmental and labour standards are low. Indeed, 
governments of these countries may be willing to use such standards to 
create comparative advantage and lower the costs of operations in the 
knowledge that businesses and foreign investment will be attracted. 
We next turn to how this plays out in our four country case studies, 
focusing in particular on working conditions in cocoa cultivation and 
garment manufacture. 
30 See The Rise of Bangladesh Garment Industry: Globalisation, Women Workers and Voice (Ahmed, 2004).
31 See Ready-Made Garment Sector in Bangladesh: Its Contribution and Challenges towards Development (Islam et al, 2016). 
32 See The Paradox of Export Growth in Areas of Weak Governance: The Case of the Ready Made Garment Sector in Bangladesh (Ahmed et al, 2014).
33 See Bangladesh, with low pay, moves in on China (Bajaj, 2010).
Garments: Bangladesh and 
Myanmar
The production of garments has become a key economic activity 
for both Bangladesh and Myanmar. Bangladesh has become an 
established hub in global garment production.30 In 2011 the ready-
made garment (RMG) sector of Bangladesh was the second largest 
globally (after China). In 2015 garments generated 81% of exports 
from Bangladesh and accounted for 14% of GDP .31 The RMG sector 
generates the largest amount of trade-related foreign exchange and 
employs more than three million individuals out of Bangladesh’s 
70 million person working age population32  - more than any other 
manufacturing sector in the country.33  Myanmar by comparison is a 
MAIN CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 
IN OUR CASE STUDY COUNTRIES
Figure 1: Garments Global Value Chain  Source:  Authors’ own with value chain distribution figures from Abdulsamad et al. (2015)
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relative newcomer, but growth in the sector in this country has been 
rapid, particularly following the 2013 ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) 
agreement with the EU following the transition from military junta. This 
granted full tariff free access was granted to European markets for all 
exports except arms and armaments. Since then Myanmar exports to 
the EU have grown tenfold.34
The garment value chain extends from raw material production (e.g. 
cotton) through production, final assembly, distribution and retail to 
consumption.  As Figure (1) below shows, the percentage of value 
extracted by raw material and production is proportionally less than in 
subsequent stages, despite the higher number of workers engaged in 
the earlier stages compared to latter stages. 
In both Bangladesh and Myanmar, growth in the garment sector 
has been fuelled by a focus on lean manufacturing and attention to 
low-cost, low-value-added, and large-volume supplies with shorter 
lead times 35. Increasing pressure on margins can be connected to 
decreasing garment prices which dropped by 40 per cent in the 
mid-2000’s 36. This has happened alongside reports of extensive 
labour abuses and a rise in unauthorised subcontracting to small 
factories where working conditions are claimed to be even worse 37. 
In Myanmar there has been a massive increase in foreign investment 
and employment in the garment sector in recent years, particularly from 
Chinese manufacturers. The International Labour Office (ILO) estimated 
in 2017 that the garment sector in Myanmar employed 738,000 
workers38 with the Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association 
(MGMA) forecasting that this figure will grow to 1.5 million by 2024. In 
2017, garment exports from the country were worth over $2 billion. 
Key issues affecting the garment sector and 
its workers 
The dangerous working conditions in the garment sector in Bangladesh 
were highlighted to the world with the horrific Rana Plaza tragedy in 
April 2013 39. This was when a poorly constructed eight-story building 
containing an overloaded garment factory collapsed killing 1,134 
garment workers and injuring over 2,000 more, including child workers 
40. It was found that the factory supplied companies such as Primark, 
Matalan and Bon Marche in the UK, as well as many other international 
firms. The global outrage at the Rana Plaza tragedy led to a host of 
leading clothing brands, including many from the UK, signing up to an 
34 See Exclusive: EU considers trade sanctions on Myanmar over Rohingya crisis (Emmott and Blenkinsop, 2018)
35 See Rana Plaza collapse aftermath: are CSR compliance and auditing pressures effective? (Sinkovics et al. 2016)
36 See Assessing the impact of purchasing practices on code compliance: A case study of the Bangladesh garment industry (Harley and Faiz, 2007)
37 Sinkovics et al. 2016: 624
38 See Myanmar labour issues from the perspective of enterprises: Findings from a survey of food processing and garment manufacturing enterprises (Bernhardt, Kanay De and Thida, 2017)
39 See After Rana Plaza: Building coalitional power for labour rights between unions and (consumption-based) social movement organisations (Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015) and
40 See Bangladesh’s Rana Plaza tragedy lives on for the child workers who survived (Nelson and Rashid, 2014). Child labour was identified as an issue in the 1990s in Bangladesh, leading to a 
Memorandum of Understanding in 1995 signed by the Bangladeshi Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF Bangladesh and the ILO Bangladesh. Child labour therefore 
was and is largely felt to be an historical concern for the industry.
41 ‘The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh’ was introduced alongside a second agreement – the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety.
42 See for example Hierarchies, jobs, bodies: A theory of gendered organizations (Acker, 1990), Assembling women: The feminization of global manufacturing (Caraway, 2007) and Ahmed, 2004 on 
the gendered nature of manufacturing
43 See Working Conditions in the Bangladeshi Garment Sector: Social Dialogue and Compliance (Mariani and Valenti, 2013)
44 See Health Status of the Female Workers in the Garment Sector of Bangladesh (Ahmed and Raihan, 2014); Vulnerabilities of Women Workers in the Readymade Garment Sector of Bangladesh: a 
caste study of Rana Plaza Kabir, Maple and Fatema, 2018; and Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015
45 See Sociological implications of female labor migration in Bangladesh (Asfar, 2001) and The end of textiles quotas: A case study of the impact on Bangladesh (Yang and Mlachila, 2004).
46 See Social Sustainability in the ready-made-garment sector in Bangladesh: an institutional approach to supply chains (Carlson and Bitsch, 2018)
47 See Five Years After Rana Plaza: The Way Forward (Barrett, Baumann-Pauly and Gu, 2018)
Accord 41 - a legally binding agreement between global brands and 
retailers and trade unions.
Relevant also to the experiences of children are the experiences 
of women 42 which, in the garment sectors of both Bangladesh and 
Myanmar at least, have been at the forefront of discussions around 
exploitation and poor working conditions. The sector is characterized 
as pressured and competitive setting where low-pay and job insecurity 
is endemic 43. This has a significant impact on women who make up the 
majority of garment workers, especially in Bangladesh 44 where the vast 
majority of RMG workers are women from rural areas 45.
Key Initiatives
Following Rana Plaza, the Bangladesh Accord attracted over 200 
signatories from apparel brands, retailers and importers, establishing 
a regulatory framework of independent inspections and remediation 
processes with the ILO.  As a result, many factories were made subject 
to checks for internationally required certification of safety. This 
agreement was in place for five years up to May 2018 but sanctions for 
non-compliance, such as factory closures, have lacked Government 
support 46. There is evidence of a reduction of worker deaths but there 
remain serious concerns around the safety of garment workers 47. 
Over the last three decades workers in Bangladesh have frequently 
protested about wages and working conditions.  In the five years 
preceding the Rana Plaza tragedy, there was a period of striking and 
intense clashes between workers, factory owners and the police. In 
response the Bangladeshi government formed the Industrial Police in 
October 2010, primarily to prevent and control worker protests and to 
reassure international investors and buyers. While perceived as the 
‘batons of entrepreneurs’ by workers, the public mission statement 
of the Industrial Police is to act as intermediaries, resolving disputes 
between workers and factory owners.  There are currently 3,500 
Industrial Police working across Bangladesh.  
Another initiative introduced in Bangladesh was ‘Better Work’, an ILO 
and International Finance Corporation partnership that was operational 
between April 2014 and June 2017.  It aimed to build capacity at 
the factory and national structural levels to enable stakeholders to 
develop the most appropriate strategies to address problems.  This 
included improving compliance with international and national laws 
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and regulations and improving working conditions, productivity and 
quality48. This programme aimed to close the ‘enforcement gap’ 49 i.e. 
the gap between standards set on paper and the reality for those in the 
labour market. 
Workers’ rights remain an issue of concern. At the time of writing there 
was ongoing unrest in Bangladesh involving workers in the garment 
sector. 50  The Accord is currently in the process of being replaced 
by the new ‘Transition Accord 2018’, with a shift towards domestic 
governance and regulation. As part of this shift, the Bangladeshi 
Government imposed a restraining order to enforce the closure of 
Accord’s inspection programme and enable Government takeover of 
the regulatory work, even though the ability of the ‘Remediation and 
Coordination Cell’ (RCC) to do this effectively is in question. 51 The 
minimum wage at the time of the research, set in 2013, was 5,300 
Taka per month ($63), still significantly lower than demands for a 
living wage52 and there are a host of compliance issues in relation to 
enforcing minimum wage, labour laws for safety and trade unions 53. 
In Myanmar, concerns have intensified about the extent of political 
reform and whether there has been a meaningful transition from full 
military rule in Myanmar’s ‘disciplined democracy’ 54. Since August 
2017, refugees from the minority Rohingya Muslim community have 
been fleeing what the UN describe as a textbook example of ethnic 
cleansing 55. To put pressure on the government to address this crisis, in 
October 2018 the EU Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmstrom, notified 
Myanmar of potential trade sanctions by the EU on textiles, which could 
include withdrawal from the EBA agreement. 56 
Anxieties about working conditions also exist in the rapidly growing 
garment industry in Myanmar alongside doubts about the country’s 
ability to enforce legislation to adequately address them 57. The nature 
of the type of ‘Cut, Make, Pack’ (CMP) products in Myanmar, which in 
this setting requires raw materials to be imported, pose another set 
of challenges for ensuring good working conditions. The country is 
described as a significant provider of the quickly turned around ‘fast 
fashion’ products demanded by the rapid moving markets of Asia 
and Europe 58. Associated labour rights abuses including low pay, low 
unionisation, excessive overtime and child labour have thus intensified 
and are cited as posing urgent dangers to the sector59.
48 See Better Work Bangladesh Programme (ILO, 2018)
49 See The Politics of Corporate Responsibility and Child Labour in the Bangladeshi Garment Industry (Nielsen, 2005)
50 See Garment worker killed and 50 injured in Bangladesh clashes (Industriall, 2019)
51 See Update: What is happening with the Bangladesh Accord? (Preuss, 2018) and Bangladesh to eject safety inspectors brought in after Rana Plaza disaster (Safi, 2018)
52 This rose to 8,000 taka ($95) from December 2018, but is significantly lower than union demands for a living wage of 16,000 taka (See Full support for Bangladeshi garment workers’ demands on 
minimum wage Clean Clothes Campaign, 2018a)
53 See Bangladesh fashion factory safety work severely behind schedule (Butler, 2016) and Carlson and Bitsch, 2018 
54 See Suu Kyi’s Myanmar, one year on (Selth, 2017)
55 See UN human rights chief points to ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ in Myanmar (UN News, 2018)
56 Emmott and Blenkinsop, 2018
57 See A Study of Labour Conditions in Garment Factories in Myanmar which are wholly Korean owned or in a Joint Venture with Korean Companies (Action on Labour Rights, 2016) and The 
Myanmar Dilemma: Can the garment industry deliver decent jobs for workers in Myanmar? (SOMO, 2017)
58 See Myanmar Case Study for the Workforce Disclosure Initiative Workforce Disclosure Initiative, 2017 and Fashion Revolution, 2018
59 See Action on Labour Rights, 2016; SOMO, 2017; Workforce Disclosure Initiative, 2017
60 See Myanmar Garment Workers Threaten Further Strikes if Demands Are Not Met (Radio Free Asia, 2015)
61 Action on Labour Rights, 2016
62 See Myanmar Country Study Fair Wear Foundation, 2016
63 This increased to 4800 kyats late in 2018.
64 See New Government’s Initiatives for Industrial Development in Myanmar (Min and Kudo, 2013)
65 See Fairness Perceptions and Reservation Wages: The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wage Laws (Falk, Fehr and Zehnder, 2006) and ALR, 2016; SOMO, 2017; Workforce Disclosure Initiative, 2017  
66 See Sustainable cocoa development in the Dominican Republic (Naturebank, 2016).
67  See Cocoa Supply In The Dominican Republic: Challenges & Opportunities (La Croix, 2013) and ICCO Panel recognizes 23 countries as fine and flavour cocoa exporters (International Cocoa Organisation, 
2016)  
Workers have been increasingly vocal 60 in expressing their 
dissatisfaction with these conditions. According to Government data 
between 2012 and 2014, 447 demonstrations took place in factories 
within the sector in Myanmar. 61 In 2015, the country established a 
daily minimum wage, argued to still not represent a ‘living wage’, 62 
of 3,600 Myanmar Kyats, approximately £1.80 GBP. 63 This attempt 
by Government to tackle low pay in the sector nevertheless took 
place in a context where compliance with labour laws are said to 
be inconsistent64. In some cases the minimum wage has not been 
implemented, or if it has, in real terms it has lowered income insofar as 
employers expect workers to undertake unpaid overtime, increase pay 
deductions or lower the wages of more senior staff. 65 
Cocoa: Ghana and 
Dominican Republic
Ghana is an established and significant producer of cocoa in global 
terms, while the Dominican Republic is an emerging producer that is 
seeking to grow its market share. Ghana accounted for almost 20% 
of the world’s cocoa in 2012 according to the International Cocoa 
Organisation. The DR grows only around 1% of the world’s cocoa and 
imports more cocoa for domestic consumption than it produces, but 
there has been a concerted effort to increase production. Another 
contrast is in terms of the countries’ relative wealth. Ghana is classed as 
‘middle income’, yet much of the population in this predominantly rural 
country with a low GDP per capita continues to struggle with poverty. 
The Dominican Republic (DR) is one of the fastest growing economies 
in Latin America/the Caribbean and experienced growth of 213% in 
2004-2014 66 and a GDP per capita several times higher than in Ghana.  
As Figure 2 shows, both Ghana and the Dominican Republic are 
seeking to capture some or all of production through to manufactuing, 
which accounts for less than one third of the total value extracted 
from cocoa. However, there are differences in the approaches taken 
by the two countries. The Dominican Republic is not going the way of 
Myanmar in seeking to emulate low-cost high scale production of the 
more established producer. DR has sought to produce higher quality 
and more ethical cocoa and claims it is the best in the world.67 It has 
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certainly become a market leader in the exportation to Europe of 
‘ethical’ (i.e. Fair trade) and organically certified cocoa. Today, 60% of 
DR cocoa is organically-certified and shipped to Europe (principally, 
Spain, France, Germany, Holland, the UK and Italy). The cocoa 
produced in Ghana ends up in products from the best-known chocolate 
brands created by Nestle, Mondelez (Cocoa Life), Cargill, Divine, Barry 
Callebout and Ferrero. 
Additionally, the key actors in cocoa cultivation and export in each 
country are different. In DR, Conacado, a recently privatised domestic 
company, dominates the cocoa industry, albeit with competition 
growing. Private companies such as Rizek and Roig, cocoa families with 
a long tradition in the sector, contribute to 85% of domestic production. 
In Ghana, the state has historically been more dominant, not least 
as the governance over all cocoa sales (Cocobod) and a majority 
shareholder (60%) in the domestic Cocoa Producing Company (CPC) 
Golden Tree, but there has also been a trend of privatisation in recent 
years. 
Key issues affecting the sector and its 
workers 
Cocoa cultivation has for a long time been associated with child 
labour, and Ghana is often cited as a country where this is a key 
issue. Research into the initiatives that have been adopted around 
exploitation and child labour have concluded that these need to be 
better linked with supply chain governance, capacity building and other 
68 See Cocoa production in the Dominican Republic: sustainability, challenges and opportunities (Berlan and Berges, 2013: 95)
69  Ibid. (citing Siegel and Alwang, 2004)
70  Ibid: p41
71  Land is inherited by the mother or siblings of a farmer, not the spouse or children.
72  The PBC’s used to be the main State agency responsible for purchasing cocoa beans directly from farmers. However, in the early 1990’s, the internal marketing of cocoa was liberalized and a 
number of private entities (LBC’s) were given license to purchase cocoa beans directly from the farmers alongside the PBC’s. LBC’s work directly with certification organisations (such as Cocoa-Nect, 
UTZ, Rainforest Alliance) and with initiatives run by chocolate companies.
73  The price of cocoa is fixed at 7,600 GHS per tonne. Between September 2016 and February 2017, more than a third of its value was wiped out with a tonne of cocoa going from above US$3,000 
to below US$1,900 (Cocoa Barometer, 2018).
policy areas (Griek and Penikett 2010).
Cocoa producers (farmers) in DR are largely born poor and die poor: 
most are in debt and many have to seek additional sources of income 
to supplement the earnings from cocoa.68 Child labour is also reported 
to be an issue for DR, but primarily in other agricultural sectors such 
as sugarcane and coffee. The sector in DR is dominated by small 
producers, but this is a changing landscape. Batista (2009) reports 
that 64.4% of cocoa producers own less than 80 tareas (5 hectares) of 
land, and land ownership is a major issue in DR.69 Less than 50% of the 
rural population has access to formally titled land and many producers 
do not have official documents proving ownership of land.  The 
inheritance system in DR is said to account for the prevalence of small 
farm holdings because assets, including land holdings, are split evenly 
between the surviving spouse and offspring70. The issue of companies 
buying up land and the workforce shifting over time to comprise more 
labourers rather than farmers has been identified already.
Similarly in Ghana, the farmers growing cocoa are mostly small-holders 
and land ownership is an issue, affected by matrilineal inheritance 
rules71. The sector is further complicated by structural issues around 
the state-based cocoa buying entities. The Government-run Cocobod, 
which sits under the Ministry of Agriculture, purchases cocoa from the 
now privatised Licensed Buyer Companies (LBCs) and Produce Buying 
Companies (PBCs) who purchase beans from local farmers72. Since 
2015, Cocobod has fixed the price at which the State buys cocoa from 
these entities. This is argued to have protected farmers’ income to 
some extent during the decline of the world market price for cocoa73. 
Figure 2:  Cocoa Global Value Chain Source: Authors’ own with value chain distribution figures from Abdulsamad et al. (2015)
Main challenges and responses in our case study countries  | 13
The new ‘gold rush’ Ghana is experiencing has a number of potential 
impacts for cocoa cultivation. Despite government outlawing sales 
of land for small scale (gold) mining in 2017/2018, it remains that, for 
some farmers, if they are approached to sell their land for mining, this 
is an attractive proposition as it is seen in the short term to be a better 
income than cocoa. This has reportedly had a number of effects on 
working conditions in cocoa cultivation: children are claimed to be 
getting involved in the much more dangerous and unregulated illegal 
mining activity as opposed to cocoa labouring74; nearby water sources 
can become contaminated and land becomes unstable. Even if farmers 
lease the land to prospectors, which has happened in the recent past, 
when returned it is unusable. This is just one part of a bigger picture 
of the interaction of economic forces and local legislation (child rights 
and regulatory activities) which, it could be argued, has transferred 
child exploitation problems away from cocoa cultivation to other parts 
of society. 
Key Initiatives
The cocoa sector in DR is regularly portrayed as a success story 
and widely considered a model of good practice,75 and this links to 
increasing buyer demand from the region. Pay and conditions are 
considerably better than in other sectors, particularly ones that have 
traditionally relied on migrant (Haitian) labour76. There is a relatively 
rich history of efforts to achieve ‘child labour-free’ cocoa. The major 
certification schemes forbid employment of children under 18 for 
anything other than light work. 
74  Moral economies and child labour in artisanal gold mining in Ghana (Okyere, 2018)
75  Wax, M. (2018) ‘Transitioning to High-Quality Sustainable Cocoa in the Dominican Republic: A Success Story’ World Cocoa Foundation 
76  In contrast to labour practices used in the production of sugar and bananas, two sectors typically associated with the ill-treatment and exploitation of Haitians.
77  Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 2016: 8
78  Tulane University, 2015; Le Baron, 2018
In response to the recommendations for ‘enhanced efforts to eliminate 
barriers and make education accessible for all children’77 a number of 
key government mechanisms have been established in DR to address 
child labour. Children are allowed to work from the age of 14, but only 
light work is allowed under the age of 18. DR now has compulsory 
education in place for all children up to the age of 18, extended from 
half a day to full days, and children of Haitian descent are able to obtain 
birth certificates or identity documents to reduce their vulnerability 
to labour exploitation and ease their access to schooling. Similarly, in 
Ghana,78 there have been a number of efforts to combat child labour. 
These include Government actions to improve governance of cocoa 
production - to make secondary education free to access from 2017 
and the establishment of Child Protection Committees in cocoa-
growing regions. 
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MSA Statements analysis and UK 
stakeholder interviews
In order to connect the transparency agenda with the lived experiences 
in the two sectors, we undertook a small sample analysis of 40 
MSA statements produced in the UK by companies who sell or 
produce chocolate and/or garments. We found a significant number 
of companies’ statements were non-compliant, which supports the 
findings of other research relating to MSA statements.79 There were 
also significant gaps in information on cocoa and on actions to address 
child exploitation in both sectors. (The full report of this study:  
www.liverpool.ac.uk/politics/research/research-projects/ccc/msa/ )
The analysis of MSA statements was supplemented with stakeholder 
interviews with 15 individuals whose role is to produce such statements 
from key national and international businesses in the UK, and with 
civil society organisations involved in monitoring. The results of this 
research are combined with insights from the fieldwork we carried out 
in the four case study countries and presented in the second part of the 
findings below.
Fieldwork in Ghana, Dominican Republic, 
Bangladesh and Myanmar
The main component in our research was fieldwork carried out in 
Ghana, Dominican Republic, Bangladesh and Myanmar. 
We spoke with 265 worker and other stakeholders80 about labour 
experiences and conditions in the cocoa and garment sectors, through 
semi-structured interviews and focus groups. We worked closely with 
partners in each country and commissioned locally based researchers 
(listed at the start of this report) to undertake the majority of the semi-
structured interviews in the participants’ first language. This avoided 
misinterpretation or incorrect interpretation due to shared language 
and understanding of cultural norms. Even with local researchers, 
however, we faced challenges in communication. In Ghana, for 
example, where there are over 250 languages spoken across the 
country, researchers had to use a variety of methods to engage with 
the small number of internal migrant workers they came across. 
Where possible and appropriate, some additional interviews were 
carried out with stakeholders in English. Researchers gained access to 
workers and stakeholders through a ‘snowballing’ technique81 usually 
starting with an interview with a key stakeholder such as a union or 
labour-based organisation which would lead to introductions to other 
79  CORE, 2017; Ergon Associates, 2018; Phillips et al, 2018; Stevenson and Cole, 2018
80  Including NGO’s, trade unions, local government and civil society. Participant breakdown – Appendix C
81  Kaplan et al, 1987
interviewees. In Ghana, we required the approval of gatekeepers - 
‘chief farmers’ - in each community and the consent of school head 
teachers (in the case of children that participated in the focus group 
discussions). In the case of garment production, our approach meant 
we were concentrated mainly on workers at the factories and did not 
access the lowest tiers of the supply chain, where the jobs such as 
dyeing, embroidering and labelling happen, often through outsourcing, 
in ad-hoc, unregulated settings, or even in workers’ homes outside of 
the regulated garment districts.
Findings: Part 1 - The 
Impact of ‘Transparency’ on 
Children
As mentioned earlier, we did not set out in our fieldwork to identify 
cases of modern slavery or measure levels of child labour. Rather, 
our main aim was to expand our understanding of the ‘transparency’ 
agenda beyond working conditions to how it affects and impacts on the 
life experiences of children and their families. We sought to investigate 
the ways that children are affected by the experience of work in these 
sectors, both as the children of parents working in these conditions and 
as young workers themselves. To achieve this, we spoke to children 
working or ‘helping’ in the supply chain. The majority of these were 
involved in work within the cocoa sector, but a small number were 
also involved in garments.  We also spoke to adult workers about their 
working histories, to understand how their working conditions and 
experiences impact on their family life, particularly their children. 
Who are the workers we spoke to?  Our participant group was mainly 
made up of front-line production workers, although we did have 
some in both sectors who occupied different levels of seniority in the 
production process.  The term ‘worker’ has been applied to all of those 
who work in the production process for cocoa and garments. In relation 
to cocoa, this means that farmers and labourers are grouped together. 
However, whilst farmers can often occupy the position of employer 
and labourer simultaneously, it is recognised that there are issues of 
power and hierarchy in the labour relations between a farmer and the 
labourers they employ.
 The term ‘worker’ was more easily defined in the garment sector. The 
factory-workers we spoke to were mainly those on the production 
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line doing cutting, ironing and stitching. These roles were, however, 
observed as being hierarchical and functionally separated on the basis 
of gender e.g. supervisors and managers were mostly recounted as 
being male. In factories with increasing numbers of males these were 
mainly relayed as men being recruited into specific roles working with 
automated machinery. 
Equally, but with different meaning, participants in both sectors 
referred to children as often undertaking a ‘helper’ role, both paid and 
unpaid, within the workforce. We first explore their experiences before 
considering the children of adult workers. 
Children as Workers or Helpers in the Supply 
Chain
In both our worker and stakeholder interviews we were told that in 
various shapes and forms across both sectors and all four countries, 
cases of child labour - the improper employment of children under the 
local legal working age - were still occurring but decreasing. In DR and 
Ghana, it was claimed by workers, NGOs and other stakeholders alike 
that this form of child labour was virtually non-existent.
That said, there was a general lack of understanding of the legal, social 
and economic context within the four countries in relation to children 
who were legally able to work. In both sectors, and irrespective of local 
legal regulations, buyers placed a blanket ban on the use of workers 
under the age of 18 as demonstrated in signs around the workplace:  
Our respondents told us that, although well-intentioned, the universal 
prohibition of children’s work could be linked to some unintended 
negative consequences. For example, buyers’ actions to eradicate 
children under 18 from the workplace were often described as placing 
extra economic strain on already impoverished families:
“All supplier pressure improves conditions, except when brands say 
that workers must be over 18 years old. It should be 16 years old, 
because people in Myanmar are out of school and doing dead-
end jobs. There is a huge gap since school leavers leave school at 
grade 9 at 14 years old.” Mya S06 
The unanticipated outcome of buyers and Government insisting on the 
non-presence of children in the factory was to displace, rather than 
eradicate, children’s work. Children are commonly shifted to higher risk 
situations such as factories aimed at domestic production or further 
down the supply chain in less regulated settings:
“RMG [Ready Made Garments]  for domestic market also has 
more child labour, as does farming and family businesses. Shrimp 
processing.  Contracted/daily labour.  Women bring one or two 
daughters into work with them.  Transport sectors, handmade 
cigarettes, stitching and hand embroidery.  Kids as young as 6-7 
years old up to 15 years old.”  Ban S10
Governments of the countries in which we conducted our fieldwork 
were seen as responding to outside pressure, especially from foreign 
investors, to eradicate child labour, but in a way that was not sensitive 
to context or to the welfare of those that would be affected, particularly 
where no positive alternatives are available in the form of income or 
education. 
“There was a case recently when an audit found a young girl who 
was 14, and they handed this over to the manager who simply fired 
her. But according to the code of conduct there should be provision 
made for funding the child’s education and so on, but they didn’t 
do any of that. Later the same manager told them they can apply 
again to get a job again.” Mya S01
“The child labour law is also complicated. You can employ a child 
at 14, for 4 hours. But they are told to work 8. The worker doesn’t 
complain. If they do, they are fired.  Child workers become street 
children, which is more dangerous. There is no plan to handle child 
labour. If fired, they’ll get closer to criminal areas.  So we don’t handle 
child issues. It will become more difficult for families.” Mya S05
In Ghana and Bangladesh the government has extended mandatory 
schooling until the age of 18 in attempt to eradicate the worst forms of 
child labour. We were told this was further exacerbating the impact of 
the ‘ban’ on child labour. Our participants questioned the value of this 
policy, particularly in a context of local labour markets that have high 
levels of unemployment. Concerns were raised that children in formal 
education were missing out on gaining the vocational skills needed to 
compete for work. This was particularly significant in cocoa, where the 
incorporation of children into the sector was linked to issues around 
succession and sustainability:
“This has its problems. This is because we are not living in a 
developed country, there are not as many opportunities. Our 
parents were producers. So even though children live in the 
countryside where there is not a lot of opportunities. They just go 
to school, they graduate, then there is a gap in the society as they 
have no way of finding a job. They learn how to write…There is no 
generational relief. Because of this, there are children who are not 
working in the countryside. There are many international actors 
arriving in the country. They know the sector and have an interest 
in cocoa. Many people with a lot of money, many rich people. What 
is happening is that many landowners are giving up their land.” DR 
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In the past, the perception of child labour has been closer to definitions 
of child slavery, i.e. coercive employment of underage children for 
dangerous kinds of work. Our findings regarding cocoa cultivation 
suggest that this sort of child labour has been largely eradicated 
(Ghana) or even misrepresented (Ghana and DR). 
In the garment sector we were told that child labour had not been 
eradicated but rather has become invisible. This happened in a number 
of ways: with the purposeful disguising or hiding of child workers from 
audits and inspections; or by pushing this form of employment further 
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down the supply chain to less visible (and less regulated) factories. 
Our evidence suggests that children continue to make a significant 
contribution to production in this sector. Workers of all ages in both 
sectors, when asked to describe how they entered into their current 
employment, regularly described the situation of working as ‘helpers’ 
and how that was key to gaining the requisite skills and experience. 
There were nuances in the meaning of this phrase. It sometimes meant 
unpaid ‘helpers’ in the workplace, perhaps accompanying parents/
family members. Other times it meant being apprenticed, either unpaid 
or on a lower wage, into specific occupations. In the latter, this was 
prevalent in young garment workers aged 16 to 18 years who were 
legally able to work:
Ali
I am 19 years old.
I started my job in a garment factory in my childhood, 13. 
At that time nobody wanted to recruit me as a worker. I was even not 
physically matured. 
My father died when I was too young. My siblings were also merely 
kids. 
My elder brother was working in a shop. But his income was not 
sufficient to run our family. 
So I started coming to the factory with my mother and sister to help 
out.
Then I got a job on the machines. 
I like it very much. It is safe.
I work overtime a lot as I don’t have anything else to do and it makes 
my pay a little better. 
They prefer us young workers as we work quicker than the older 
women. 
I don’t know if they are over 18 years old. Sometimes people have 
fake ID or birth certificates. Their parents help them to get them so 
that they can start helping the family.
No one really checks.
Factories do still have children here but not as much as before. 
In other places they hide them if a buyer comes to visit.
In garment settings, similar to the cocoa sector, children’s work is 
partly about gaining experience which improves their employment 
opportunities later in life. This could be by learning to use machinery 
with relatives at home or in their workplace or ‘helping out’ in 
factories to acquire experience and understanding of the work. This 
seemingly innocuous ‘work experience’ is, however, complicated by 
the reports that children, ranging from those in their late teens to those 
much younger, are being used far more regularly and clandestinely 
in factories, sometimes in contravention of local labour laws and 
regulations or buyers’ rules. 
In Myanmar, children can acquire a special  apprentice status under 
domestic labour law. This makes it permissible to pay child workers 
a proportion of a regular wage which then incrementally increases 
over time (50%, 75% and then 100% after a fixed period). However, 
our respondents reported that factories terminated these workers’ 
contracts before they achieved full salary, replacing them with new, 
cheaper apprentices. Overall, we found that in the garment sector, 
employers in Myanmar and Bangladesh exploited loopholes around 
children’s work. Our adult participants reported that when they started 
work as a ‘helper’ they were routinely made to work longer hours and 
for less pay than older, established colleagues. Workers also made 
reference to children being used for ‘unseen’ work such as cleaning 
or on a temporary or seasonal basis when orders had to be completed 
under time pressure. We were told that these child workers were 
hidden or removed when a buyer visit, audit or inspection took place. 
Due to these rules around apprenticeships and others related to the 
minimum wage (where children are often excluded), younger workers 
are cheaper for the factory to employ than older staff. The practice 
of paying young workers less than their older counterparts appears 
commonplace. Our findings suggest that this broad category of helpers/
workers needs further exploration in relation to risks of exploitative 
labour practices. 
Two further ways in which the needs and experiences of children 
working in the supply chains for both sectors have become obscured 
were described in all countries. Firstly, in circumstances of extreme 
poverty, we were told of examples where both children and 
parents consciously circumvented rules and laws by acquiring false 
identification or by not providing documentation that might reveal 
a child’s age. This was revealed as especially prevalent in relation 
to migrant workers, including internal migrants from rural to urban 
locations. This makes it extremely difficult to estimate with any accuracy 
the true extent of child work and child labour. Secondly, we found 
examples where children were accompanying parents and families to 
work, often unpaid but not necessarily doing work that is dangerous 
or harmful. We were told that this was in order to help their parents 
achieve targets or complete tasks, meaning that although they were 
working, they were not seen as ‘workers’. 
It is clear from these cases that children are rendered invisible in the 
supply chain due to combination of formal exclusion from the labour 
market with the economic necessity to work and contribute to the 
household. While we did not set out to record examples of child labour 
or child slavery, this situation increases the risk that children could be 
made vulnerable to these types of exploitation.
Different perceptions of child labour are further complicated by 
connections with other social problems. For example, interviews 
workers and stakeholders spoke of children appearing in the 
workforce, often in locations away from their families, because 
they were escaping difficult situations. These ranged from child 
marriage, domestic or familial violence to abject poverty. By removing 
employment as a potential route out of these situations, our 
interviewees were concerned that vulnerable children could be forced 
to enter into much more dangerous work.
In cocoa settings, our interviewees who had worked as children 
recalled how they had often helped their farmer parents outside of 
the mandatory school hours. While there was a positive perception 
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among most of the farmers and labourers we spoke to with regard 
to making school attendance mandatory, this was overshadowed by 
other concerns. These included scarce employment opportunities 
and the high cost of further education, forcing children to migrate or 
fall into a poverty trap. In their responses adult workers underlined 
the importance of their experience as a child for the work they were 
currently involved in. As there is generally no formal training or 
education that workers can access to become a trained cocoa labourer 
or farmer, the experience as a child worker was cited as essential.
Essie
I am 14 years old.
My parents have two cocoa farms. One is about half an hour from 
home. The other is two hours by walking.
During the week I am in school. My school is about one and a half 
hours walk from my village.
I leave about 7.30 with my brother and get to school at 9.
We get home about 4pm.
We do our homework and our chores. If the harvest is in, we help to 
dry the beans and stir the pot. This is at our house.
We only go to the farms at the weekend or on the school holidays.
I don’t mind helping out. My father says when the harvest goes well 
we all benefit.
Neither me or my brother like going to the farm that is far away. We 
leave about 6am and come back at about 4pm. If we go to the other 
one the day is much shorter and I get time to play with my friends.
I help by making food for us to eat while we are there. I help to col-
lect the pods, break the pods and carry them to the road where they 
can get collected by the man who drives the bicycle. It can be very 
heavy sometimes but I put them on my head.
I also help sometimes with the seedlings.
If there are labourers there I sometimes fetch them water or food 
from the woman in the village.
I don’t do the weeding or burning. My brother helps our father with 
that. He is 16. He hates it though. He says his back hurts.
I don’t do the spraying [of fertilisers]. I get the water for my father and 
brother so they can do it.
I don’t know if I want to be a cocoa farmer when I grow up. It is a lot 
of hard work for not very much money. I think I would rather be a 
government worker.
For farmers with children, their involvement is regularly seen as 
essential to maintaining farms and preparing children to take over 
the family business as adults. Land ownership and inheritance was 
a feature of interviews with farmers in both Ghana and Dominican 
Republic. In many Ghana regions, inheritance of land by children is not 
automatic.  The practice of matrilineal inheritance means that if a man 
dies his wife and children are excluded from ownership and inheritance 
of property. Therefore, it is inherited by members of his maternal 
family, for example his brothers and sisters. Children who know how 
to farm the land are believed to be in a stronger position to argue for 
inheritance. However, there was a more significant issue relayed by 
cocoa farmers relating to the necessity of using family ‘help’ to keep 
their formal labour costs down, in spite of formal prohibitions:
“After 16 there is the Work Code that says that children can do 
something on the farm. When we go with the inspectors, we never 
see children. They might be there but we don’t see them. I go out 
with the technicians, with the certifiers. The Work Code and the 
certifications do not allow this. But you do see children helping out 
with the food. Sometimes they’re on the farms to take food to the 
workers. But machetes – that is not allowed. Maybe they do it but 
it’s not allowed. We go every now and then to the farms. We don’t 
speak to the workers. When we go, we carry out the interviews with 
the producer [farmer].” DR S12
There were some that expressed resistance to this blanket ban, 
particularly for those children of school age working during holidays 
or free time and for those 16-18 who may not be in education. We 
were told that this work could provide a vital income for children and 
families, helping alleviate poverty. We were also told that it could add 
to vulnerabilities of particular groups of children for trafficking and 
exploitation in more risky work including ‘galamsay’ small scale-mining 
(Ghana) or street work, often leaving them vulnerable to criminal 
exploitation. Some children in Ghana who end up in this work were 
described as not only attempting to escape from rural poverty but also 
from abusive families or forced marriage. This was not the only time that 
the risk to children was said to be indirectly exacerbated by company 
demands and state interventions to remove children from work.
Our interviews with NGOs in Ghana attributed a reduction in child 
labour in cocoa to their own efforts and those of the government 
ministry and NGO interventions. Our interviewees often commented 
that the blanket removal of child involvement in cocoa cultivation 
(under 18) means that the younger generation are not getting to know 
any aspect of the business. We were told that children remain informally 
involved in farming, to a greater extent in Ghana than DR, mostly 
working on weekends or holidays during particular seasons. 
Notwithstanding these complexities, there has been clear investment 
across all countries in tackling child labour, not just through the 
introduction of rules on prohibition, but through added investment 
in education.  Ghana and DR have launched public awareness 
programmes regarding school attendance, and some schools and 
canteens have been established by chocolate companies. Regional 
Child Protection Committees have been set up in Ghana to deal with 
reported cases of child labour. NGOs have received funding to pursue 
intervention, training and awareness raising programmes at grassroots 
level, and to reveal instances of non-compliance with child labour laws. 
However, in Ghana it was relayed that funding for these programmes 
have mostly come to an end and there are concerns that, without 
consistent and sustainable efforts, child labour issues will reappear. 
The Impact of Parents’ Experience of Work on Children 
As the previous section has demonstrated, legal, policy and structural 
interventions to tackle child labour at international and domestic level 
have focused largely on removing children from work deemed to be 
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harmful. There has been relatively little attention, in a development 
context, on the extent to which the working conditions of adults 
impact on their children. In our research with workers in both sectors 
we found that the nature of the work they did and their work-related 
entitlement (notably pay and pregnancy, care-related and holiday leave) 
had profoundly negative effects on their family life. The seasonal and 
rural nature of cocoa work, in particular, necessitates long periods of 
separation from children and makes it difficult for parents to provide 
a consistent and sufficient level of income for their families across the 
year. Such issues are not exclusive to farm workers though; farmers 
themselves commonly take on additional loans to sustain wages and 
support their own income throughout the year,82 entrenching long term 
debt and family poverty. 
Children of parents who are ‘working poor’
In both the sectors that we examined, and in all four of our case-
study countries, children were often a central concern in many 
workers’ experiences of work. The working life of poorly paid workers 
were reported to bear a significant impact on their children and in 
circumstances of extreme poverty, they were often essential financial 
contributors to the family.
Separated Families
In both garments and cocoa cultivation, in settings of high poverty and 
unemployment rates, we found a very high incidence of workers living 
separately - or separated for long periods - from their families (parents, 
spouses or children), in order to undertake work. They reported that 
they made this choice out of economic necessity. Often the decision 
to move away from family (or to keep children at home in their family 
village in kinship care arrangements) could be directly connected 
to low wage levels. We found evidence that this had a significant 
emotional impact on workers, including feelings of stress, unsafety and 
anxiety. We also found evidence of other negative impacts including 
fatigue, poor health and poor diet. These impacts were exacerbated by 
long working days due to overtime and the commute to and from the 
workplace. 
In the garment sector workers consistently raised the issues of the 
high cost of living in comparison to their pay rates. Economies are 
typically made through sharing accommodation with other colleagues 
or extended family. Many workers told us that they were living in slums 
close to their place of work for reasons of affordability and convenience 
(to minimise the cost and time associated with commuting). Those 
separated from the rest of their family (in particular those separated 
from their children) spoke of how they reduced their living costs to 
the bare minimum to be able to send money home for their children’s 
education, clothes and maintenance. 
82  Berlan and Berges 2013
83  Workers may work more hours when an order is due, often unpaid.
84  As above
85  Based on average production of 40 quintals per year at 5,000 DOP per quintal/100lb (variable prices). Above minimum wage of 234DOP for farm workers, but this is calculated on what farmers 
told us about sales of cocoa but does not include deductions for unknown running costs of farm, including labourers pay. In DR, costs are suggested to be anywhere between 1500-3000 DOP per 
tarea (area of land) – this would mean most farmers earn less than the labourers (IDIAF, 2006; Berlan and Berges 2013)
86  Above minimum wage of 234DOP for farm workers, but work is seasonal.
87  Based on average production of 18 bags of cocoa per year, at 475 GHS per 64 kg bag. Calculated on what farmers told us about sales of cocoa but does not include deductions for unknown 
running costs of farm including labourers pay. 
NGO representatives commented on the impact of poor working 
conditions on the physical well-being of factory workers; instances of 
fainting during work due to poor nutrition are commonplace.  Workers 
in both sectors reported restricting certain foods in their diet to what 
was affordable, specifically removing meat was a common action. 
Female workers especially spoke of restricting their own meals to 
ensure that they could feed larger portions or more expensive foods 
such as meat or chicken to their husbands and children. 
Living Wages
Table 2:  Case study country data on daily pay, working patterns and staple food cost
Country Daily Pay Working 
Pattern
Average 
cost of 1 kg 
white rice
Bangladesh 203 Taka ($2.40)
Minimum Wage
10 hours per 
day /6 days 
per week83
$0.75
Myanmar 3,600 Kyats 
($1.80)
Minimum Wage
8 hours per 

















8 hours per 
day/6 days 
per week 















8 hours per 
day/6 days 
per week 
(144 days per 
year)
$1.84
It is difficult to demonstrate the true impact of pay on the ability to have 
a decent quality of life. However, the above table seeks to illustrate, by 
reference to the average cost of a kilogramme of rice in the different 
countries, the struggle facing most workers across both sectors to 
manage the cost of living. This is even more acute for those bearing the 
full burden of providing income for the family. Even where a minimum 
wage exists, particularly for garment workers, this does not reflect 
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the cost of living. In the case of cocoa farmers, the picture is more 
complex and less secure. Fluctuating cocoa prices mean that income 
is not always predictable and by no means sufficient to enable them 
to cover the costs of labourers and other expenses. Indeed, in both 
cocoa producing countries we examined, farmers were very likely to be 
earning less than the labourers they employed.
Cocoa Workers: Age and Gender
Females were present in our participant group, both as formal and 
informal workers on cocoa farms but, in contrast to garments, the sector 
is predominantly and visibly male in the farmer and labourer ‘formal’ 
workforce. This has an impact on how the ‘ideal worker’ manifests in 
this setting, with men performing the physically demanding work, and 
women and children performing more of a ‘supporting’ role:
George
I am 63 years old. 
I have been on this land all my life. My parents were also cocoa 
farmers and when they passed I took over the farm. 
Cocoa is my life.
I learned from my family. I never had any training to do this job.
It is a hard job but cocoa has provided for my children and sent them 
to school. 
My wife helps me with the farm. It was hard when she was with child.
When the children were old enough though at least we had help.
I don’t know if I could look after a young family now on this little 
money we make. 
The cost of producing cocoa is so high that we barely make any 
profit anymore.
There is something that needs to be done on the land all year round, 
weeding, burning, clearing the land, planting the seedlings, spraying 
the crops. 
We usually work everyday for as long as the sun is up, but when it is 
too hot we finish around 1pm.
The only time I make money is for what I sell to the producers/buying 
company after the harvest. We don’t get a monthly wage. So we sell 
a little plaintain, yam or bananas throughout the year.
I only employ labourers when I am desperate, so usually at harvest 
time. 
I go to the village or marketplace to find them. 
They either are known to us farmers or they announce themselves 
as new to the village. They are usually another labourer’s family 
member from back home.
It is more or less a fixed wage for labourers, so no one feels cheated.
For weeding, I pay them a little money upfront and the rest when 
they are done. 
If its harvest time they get the rest when I sell the beans.
I don’t have any equipment to give the labourers, they have to bring 
their own wellington boots and cutlass. 
88  Sharecropper = a tenant farmer who gives a part of each crop as rent
If they get stung, cut themselves or get snakebite my wife and I try to 
take care of it. 
To send them to hospital costs a lot of money, but there have been 
times when we have had to pay.
There is no union for labourers but I have never had a dispute.
The union for farmers, I don’t see what benefit there is for me in 
joining that. The small help we used to get, like extra payments on 
our harvest or some soap, we don’t see anymore.
Age is a significant issue in this sector; most farmers are older 
males and most labourers are younger males. This presents real 
challenges for the sustainability of small-scale family-run cocoa 
farms. An ageing farming population, coupled with the prohibition of 
children’s involvement in cocoa farming means that there are limited 
opportunities to nurture younger generations as farmers.  Workers are 
acutely aware not only of the precarity of their work in cocoa, but also 
of concerns related to the future of cocoa production.  
“We have a really bad problem with young people not being 
interested in continuing the work of their parents. In 2011, 72% of 
producers are about 50 years of age. And that was already seven 
years ago. 18% of women, total of producers. 80% of them were 
over 50 years old. We have a problem. 80% of our producers have 
less than 5 tareas or less. It’s not a lot of land.” DR S13
In the case of cocoa cultivation in Ghana, not only did the farmers 
employ labourers or work with ‘share-croppers’ on the farms but 
they also undertook most of the work themselves. Farmers and 
sharecroppers88 in Ghana often live on land close to or actually on the 
cocoa farms, and labourers tended to be a more transient population 
who are employed seasonally. 
Farming cocoa is extremely labour intensive. There is currently 
no automation in this process, other than by large exporters and 
processors. Farms are mostly run by families, headed by older males, 
although we did speak to a number of female farmers/land-owners. 
Those who undertook the farming themselves relayed that they did not 
have any formal training or education on farming but were regularly 
working with hazardous tools or chemicals, or farmers were hiring 
others to do so. Farmers did not recount using any form of safety 
equipment for themselves and labourers spoke of being expected to 
provide their own. Therefore, both farmers’ and workers’ safety in the 
farming of cocoa was at risk. The uses of certain tools and restrictions 
on use of chemicals were often described by farmers as being a 
requirement for the strict standards set by buyers. Parent workers 
spoke of the involvement of their children in farm work, with some 
reservations, but often as a pragmatic reality, and sometimes with pride. 
This was usually by small-holders who may not produce large quantities 
of cocoa, a where farmers were the only adult in the household and 
where the only other option was to leave children home alone. The 
involvement of children was directly linked to the low buyer price 
20  |  Clothes, Chocolate and Children: Realising the Transparency Dividend
and the cost of farming, especially when producing cocoa to specific 
standards or certification (e.g. organic): 
 “I have three children. They all came with me [to farm] when they 
were at least 10 years of age. When they got a little older, I would 
pay them to be on the farm and they would clear the ground 
for me. I paid them. Because I didn’t have a job…. They need to 
have clothes and food. They also need to learn how to manage 
money. I would get them to clear the ground. I would have to pay 
an outsider to do this, so why not my own children? And this has 
helped me raise three very hard-working children. “ DR W1
“I do not understand why parents are accused of promoting child 
labour even when the children work willingly to support me so 
that they can get some money when they are returning to school.  
The Government ban on child labour is affecting the production, 
negatively.. There are some farmers who do not have the means to 
hire labourers so they engage their children to do the job for them.” 
GH W26
The tasks these children undertake involve fetching water or preparing 
food (more common for girls)  preparing the land, gathering the harvest, 
helping with spraying the crops, breaking the cocoa pods and drying 
the beans. They also tend to other types of crops being grown on the 
land (such as cassava, callaloo, plantain or bananas) which provides 
essential shade for the cocoa to grow and t another form of income 
when cocoa is not in season:
“They start working at 12, 13 years. They start to learn the trade. 
You start teaching them how to work. A 7, 8 year old child they do 
work. They help out their parents. They cooperate. They help out.” 
DR WFG3435
This may be categorised as dangerous work – children spoke of using 
knives, chemicals, flammables and carrying heavy loads. There is 
mention of natural hazards such as plant stings, snakes, wasps and 
ants. Nonetheless, in Ghana and DR alike, farmers’ children’s ongoing 
involvement was expressed as a basic necessity because their income 
was not enough to give them options to do otherwise. 
Garments: how the working conditions of 
parents affects children 
There was less evidence in the fieldwork on the garments industry of 
children being recruited to work. That said, we found that the working 
conditions of their parents – and particularly women – has profound 
effects on their ability to care for their children. This was in terms of 
safety issues, abuse, harassment, long hours, enforced overtime, 
recruitment processes that may involve pregnancy checks and 
practices relating to holidays, maternity and paternity leave. 
In both Bangladesh and Myanmar we found a number of issues 
related to decent working conditions, ranging from lack of access to 
89 see Ahmed, 2004; Bank Muñoz, 2008; Caraway, 2007; Plankey Videla, 2012; Salzinger, 2003.
drinking water and adequate sanitation, to workplace bullying, old and 
faulty equipment. Work-related sickness and  injuries are commonplace. 
Enforced overtime, often unpaid, was the norm. The adherence to 
minimum wage regulations was a significant issue here. For many 
workers their employers had either not implemented the minimum wage, 
leaving workers with no option but to undertake overtime to make their 
wage more acceptable. Some employers who had implemented the 
minimum wage had accompanied it with new requirements to work 
unpaid overtime to meet the costs. Wage deductions or penalties for 
lateness, breaks, annual leave, sick leave and ‘poor performance’, were 
ubiquitous issues. We found widespread avoidance or denial of basic 
labour rights provided by law for workers such as minimum wage and 
maternity provisions. Employers claim to be increasingly squeezed by 
buyers prioritising profit margins and quick turn arounds, and this has a 
consequence for workers’ pay and conditions:
 “The price per piece has gone down since Rana Plaza. There is a 
special project by a UK firm.  It is a charity that is claiming to use 
non slave labour.  A high-end UK brand. Yet the charity gets 99% of 
the profit from the project and the factory they use in Bangladesh 
isn’t unionised. Barely legal minimum wage.  Owner hates unions. 
So even with these special projects the buyers still aren’t paying 
enough.” Ban S8
“Buyers are expecting more every year for less. The quantity of 
orders is not equal.  The orders are seasonal too.  No increase 
in workers numbers when we are busy, workers just do more 
overtime. 2-3 hours of overtime to make targets. Cost of living has 
increased, but price is the same.  Demands are higher now.  The 
biggest threat to business is the lack of price increases.  A 10% 
increase would be needed to get back to where they were just a 
few years ago. Top management does discuss with buyers about 
prices.  Sometimes they agree an increase, but only a very little.” 
Ban S13 
The garment industry in both Myanmar and Bangladesh is dominated 
by young female workers who constitute 95% of Myanmar participants 
and 75% in Bangladesh. There is an established literature which 
illuminates how gender informs the experiences of work in these 
settings.89 Consistently, in both countries, the ‘gendered workplace’ 
(Acker, 1990) prevails. especially in relation to recruitment, staff 
relations, promotion, pay and leave:
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‘Sal’
My sister got me this job. She has been here for a while. 
I am 21 years old. I was married last year. 
When I came for the recruitment, I had to do a standard health test. 
This included a pregnancy test. I wasn’t worried.
My husband is away working and I do not plan to have any children 
yet anyway as we cannot afford it.
I work every day except Friday in the factory. 
Usually we work from 8am until 8pm, but when a shipment has to be 
ready we sometimes work right through the night. 
We have to. If we don’t meet the order, we lose our jobs. 
We get some extra pay but I cant work it out on my payslip.
Usually I take lunch for an hour, I go home and cook for my parents 
and then quickly come back. But not when a shipment is due.
The supervisor gets very angry about us taking breaks. 
There is CCTV now so that means he can’t misbehave like he used 
to. Especially with the women. 
I have seen him hit a male worker with his shoe and call him bad 
names. 
Then the auditor, in front of everyone, said ‘What is your gender? Are 
you a man or a eunuch? Work fast or I will remove your balls.’  I have 
never had that sort of treatment but I know the women who clean 
here are still having misbehaviour from the male supervisors. They 
promise them a job on the machines if they give them something in 
return.
They are always watching us.
Sometimes they take money off us for being late, I’m not sure if the 
clock is right but I try to get back quickly from my break. 
I don’t really take breaks unless I really need the bathroom.
I try to do everything I need to on that break, text my husband, have 
a drink of water. 
Although the water here doesn’t taste too good. 
The bathrooms don’t smell that great either, we have a lot of workers 
in this factory.
My wages are ok as I live with my parents. 
If I am sick, I don’t get paid. Sometimes like when people get hurt by 
the needle or burnt they send you to see the nurse and then maybe 
after an hour she sends you back to work.
The pay is better when we have overtime but they don’t always tell 
you if you are getting paid for it. 
The older women, they sometimes have to stay late to finish their 
orders as they can’t work as quickly as us. The pregnant women too. 
Pregnant workers here are in miserable conditions
They don’t get any special treatment. They have to stand and do the 
same work as everyone else. 
The bosses don’t like it if you get pregnant here. 
Our maternity leave is 112 days. But, they make you go home at 
about 5 months so you have to come back as soon as the baby is 
born. If the new born baby dies, the authority curtails the leave.
90  Ahmed 2004
91  Fashion Revolution, 2018; Workforce Disclosure Initiative, 2017
Recently, two workers’ babies died after birth. Management sent 
letters to them to join office immediately. 
Our General Manager said that pregnant workers do a wrongful act 
[sex] at home and we are paying for that. If they have to pay them 
their benefits that means there is less money to pay us. I have seen a 
few women get terminated for being pregnant.
The high representation of women in the workplace balanced against 
experiences of gender-based inequalities in pay, leave and workplace 
experiences, coupled with persistent structural gender inequalities in 
health, education, law and wider society, are often defended on the 
basis that participation in work, of itself, contributes to the advancement 
of gender equality in the financial autonomy it provides for women.90 
Nevertheless, the story we heard from workers and stakeholders in 
both countries was of factories transforming their operating practices 
in ways that compound their situation. Such changes have responded 
to the demands of the fashion sector, particularly ‘fast fashion’91and its 
lean profit margins.  
Furthermore, we found evidence of a transformation in the make-up of 
workers in the garment sector in both countries. There is a perception 
that the previously female-dominated workforce is set to be no longer 
a reality within the garment sector, and the drivers behind this can be 
connected to children and families. 
First, women of child-bearing age are viewed by many employers 
as a risk due to their likelihood of becoming pregnant. The majority 
of female workers in our samples in both countries were in the age 
range of 20-29 years of age. They told us of a constant turn-over of 
staff and feelings of precarity or insecurity in their positions, and that 
employers were finding ways of avoiding or working around their 
legal responsibilities for actions such as providing maternity benefits. 
Maternity rights and pregnancy ‘monitoring’ were issues consistently 
raised by workers and stakeholders alike. We were also told by female 
workers of the common practice of pregnancy monitoring, through 
recruitment ‘health checks’ or, as in some cases in Myanmar, by daily 
questioning. 
We found that the abuse of labour rights were disproportionately 
felt by older, disabled or pregnant workers. Workers with caring 
responsibilities are in a difficult position should they choose to refuse 
to undertake overtime. They claimed they were targeted for disciplining 
and penalties to make it easier for employers to sack them or to push 
them to ‘voluntarily’ leave. Workers suggest that those who are leaving 
the workplace, especially if they are older workers with a similar work 
history to the workers within this study, have few options but to remain 
in the sector, but further down the supply chain in less-regulated or 
unregulated settings such as home-working.
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Cho
I am 29 years old.
I have worked in factories here for 4 years.
I have one son who is 3 years old. 
He is growing up in the village with my mum and auntie. 
Its kind of our tradition. We have a strong family tie. Though he 
doesn’t call me mother yet. But I’m happy.
I left the village when he was 2 months old as I had to come back to 
work. The factory gives you 112 days but makes you take most of this 
while you are pregnant, so you don’t get much time with your baby. 
They said there was somewhere where the workers children could 
be when I came here but I think they just say that for the inspectors. 
The childcare they have here is only a few places and most of them 
are the managers children. 
I was still breast feeding when I left him. That was hard. I couldn’t 
look at breast-feeding mums without crying. I cried a lot for a long 
time.
I don’t think I will have another baby. Me and my husband don’t earn 
much money, he is working away. We just cant afford it.
I can only take leave without pay so I cant afford to do that. My 
husband gets to come back maybe 2 or 3 times a year, he visits me 
then.
The factory closes twice a year for the main holidays, a couple of 
days, so I see my son and family then.  
A key issue raised in responses about workplace relations is that of 
gendered workplace violence and aggression – physical, sexual and 
verbal.
Male and female workers relayed extensive experiences of aggression 
and violence in their everyday work (57 respondents out of 90). Verbal 
and physical violence towards ‘shop-floor’ workers was outlined as 
common place; staff described being regularly hit or shouted at, 
especially during the highly pressured time of preparing goods for 
deadlines:
“I once promoted to leader but I wasn’t happy and I quit. They 
demanded higher targets and told me that I had to shout and 
swear at the workers to demand these targets. When the targets 
didn’t get met, they shouted everyone. To meet their target 
demand, sometimes it is really difficult. Some of the pieces were 
really hard to make.” Mya W26-33 
Male and female workers alike recounted abuse from supervisors 
and manager of a sexualised and gendered nature. For female 
workers, even those few who had managed to secure more senior 
roles, sexual violence, including physical touching, references to 
genitalia, labelling women as sex workers and offering of money or 
workplace ‘advantages’ in exchange for sex, appears to be normalised 
practice. “There are many reports [by female workers] of bullying and 
harassment by floor level management. Often they want women to 
give them sex for money.” (Ban S14). 
Female workers are subject to verbal and physical abuse “A few days 
ago, my supervisor vituperated me for not meeting my target in time. 
He called me motherfucker, daughter of a whore” (Ban W33 ,Female, 
22). Workers told us about the ‘bad behaviours’ of supervisors and 
line managers and routine violence. “Why these bad behaviours, 
yelling, abusive words? They pay less than the labour we give. We 
don’t have the right to talk, take leave, say no to overtime or get an 
increase in salary. Behaviour should be fair with the workers” (BanW18, 
Female, 22). Women who resist these abuses make themselves more 
vulnerable:
“I started in garment factory work when I was 11 years old with rest 
of my family. We were very poor and a big family that is why we 
worked in the factory. I haven’t finished my primary school because 
my parents had no money. I worked in the factory for 7 years, not 
paid. The lack of job security, maternity issues, these issues are 
not being addressed especially women’s issues. Respect, dignity. 
That’s what we want. I’ve been working on these issues from the 
70s, 80s. It is highly male dominated. I had a lot of experiences of 
strikes, trying to organise unions, being beaten by police and local 
‘muscle men’, them filing false cases against me. When I was 18 
years old I began as an organiser. To organise the female workers. 
All the men thought I was a prostitute, saying ‘why are you going at 
night, travelling on your own?’ (Ban S1). 
One worker (Ban W18) explained that “managers do not behave badly 
with me. I work in quality section, comparatively educated people 
work there”. The indication is that workers who are in a more skilled 
position and therefore who have higher levels of education are less 
likely to be affected by violence and aggression in the workplace. 
This implies that there are significant issues of power and privilege in 
workers experiences. Age and sexuality further impact on the nature 
and experiences of workplace violence and aggression. “I’ve had 
discrimination against my gender, because of being a tomboy. Being a 
LGBT. I don’t want to tell my parents about bad things at work because 
I don’t want them to feel sad.” (Mya W19, Female, 25). 
“If I am sick, first they swear at me. If I say no to overtime they 
swear with microphone. The managers start to swear since the 
morning. Shouting and swearing constantly. They even hit my 
head… If I make mistakes with the clothes, they deduct from my 
salary as well swear at me.” Mya 23 (Female, 17)
The experience of gendered violence at work is thus multi-dimensional 
and impacts on people differently according to role and background.  
It is nonetheless ubiquitous in the garment sector interviews and has 
important implications for children because of the effects on women 
that have caring responsibilities. 
Summary
The nature of the ‘gendered workplace’  impacts on the lives of the 
children of both male and female workers.  This is manifested in 
gender-based discrimination and bullying, and is especially acute in 
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relation to decisions around starting a family, experiences of pregnancy, 
maternity leave and pay and childcare at work This impact is observed 
in gender-based discrimination and bullying, and is especially acute 
in relation to considerations for starting a family and experiences of 
pregnancy, maternity leave and pay and childcare at work.
It is clear that the impact of the ‘gendered workplace’ on children is 
substantial. It has an impact on their relationship and connection to 
their parents. It is having an emotional impact on parents, especially 
when compounded by poor maternity and paternity leave rights and 
benefits. It has a direct impact on the health and wellbeing of children. 
Fathers are assumed to not need paternity leave or to want or need 
to take on caring responsibilities. On the one hand, the decision to 
leave children with families (who are often geographically distant) is 
often relayed as a financially sound decision. This decision is primarily 
informed by low wages and the perceived financial benefits of children 
staying in areas with lower costs of living and family support. On the 
other hand, children and parents recount a profound sense of loss and 
separation, even from birth. 
For parents especially, the impact on their children is apparent. From 
physical separation over long periods of time to poor diet to the 
necessitation of children’s presence in work, it all points to an economic 
issue which has to be addressed from both directions. If buyers paid for 
the products or produce an amount which more equally reflected the work 
required and the profits made, then locally workers’ pay could increase.
Findings: Part 2 - 
Transparency from 
expectations to reality 
UK Business Approaches and Perspectives
In this second part of our findings we connect interview data from 
businesses working to interpret and implement the TISC requirement 
in the UK with the practical realities and challenges with regards to 
working conditions in each sector. 
Approaching Modern Slavery from a Legal Compliance Perspective
the UK stakeholders interviewed were generally supportive of the 
Modern Slavery Act, noting that it had helped focus businesses on 
issues that had previously been neglected or overlooked. The majority 
of firms felt that tackling the issue of MS was challenging, echoing 
recent reports that only 8% of businesses feel that they have all the 
information and resources they need on MS.92
It was suggested to us that addressing modern slavery could represent 
a sound business strategy, i.e. with its potential appeal for customers, 
92  Mekong Club (2017) Business Response to Slavery Survey Report. 
93  The independent MSA review’s interim report on TISC has recommended a central repository and inclusion of public procurement (2019)
thus generating enthusiasm within companies and industries. This 
general optimism was contrasted with practical concerns around a 
‘compliance culture’ that was perceived as ineffective in changing 
purchasing decisions. Participants commented on the variable quality 
of MSA statements, including the use of consultants or ‘copy and paste’ 
techniques by companies in the rush to be ‘compliant’. “ I’ve had a 
couple of suppliers where I recognise elements of their statements. 
Copy and paste, change the names”. UK Stakeholder 2
These are similar concerns to the problems that we identified in our 
analysis of MSA statements. Furthermore, our respondents felt that the 
usefulness of this approach was undermined by a lack of enforcement. 
Businesses raised the issue of the need to monitor statements and 
make them centrally accessible to the public, something explicitly 
recommended by the recent Independent Review into the MSA93. We 
were given two different reasons why this would have a positive impact. 
First, by enabling the public, or NGOs, to monitor compliance with the 
requirements set out within the legislation. Secondly, to address an 
absence of transparency regarding which companies have or have not 
complied and to create genuine pressure when they have not:
 “We’re still seeing hundreds of thousands of companies that have 
still not put out a statement… many companies that are merely 
producing reports are not even legally compliant… They’re not 
getting punished for doing that and that is actually weakening the 
business case for responsible businesses to really address this 
issue, because they’re seeing their competitors not doing anything. 
Getting away with it. Seeing no repercussions.” UK Stakeholder 1
Transparency – a means to achieving 
’slavery-free status’?
The UK-based businesses we interviewed expressed the view that 
the MSA requirements had often been interpreted in a ‘competitive’ 
sense, with companies going to great lengths to demonstrate that 
there was no MS in their supply chains. However, whilst this may have 
acted as a motivator, it was not always viewed as a constructive way 
of encouraging companies to consider in a more reflective sense how 
their own actions might be contributing to the problem:
“I think no business is able to completely say they’ve got no 
modern slavery in the supply chains or in their operations and 
so different business models and the different ways companies 
are structured and governed are probably needed until we get 
much better at this.  So I can’t see it happening very soon.” UK 
Stakeholder 1
“Even if my budget was a billion pounds a year, there’s no way 
that I could have full visibility of all my supply chains and could tell 
you categorically there’s no issues in that supply chain.  Nobody 
can say that about any of their supply chains.  We’ve all got strong 
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systems in place to try and prevent it [MS] happening, coming into 
the business”. UK Stakeholder 2
Our respondents articulated their concerns around not only how to find 
modern slavery, but how to act when it is found. Many companies are 
uncertain about how best to act to balance the needs of the worker, 
their supply chain relationships, corporate communications strategy 
and shareholders with their legal obligations. 
“When the first real issue occurred in supermarket supply chains 
last year, it went public, the supplier was de-listed by one of the 
supermarkets upon reporting modern slavery.  So the message 
that that sends is out is fairly bad, isn’t it?  But that actually 
happened. In our contract with suppliers we now state that we will 
not terminate the contract. We’ll work with the supplier to tackle 
these issues, not walk away”. UK Stakeholder 2.
Taking Transparency Beyond Compliance 
and the Role of Audits
We were told that the TISC element of the MSA would only becoming 
meaningful if it was approached as taking action ‘beyond compliance’; 
working to identify and address issues which could indicate the risk of 
forced labour at present or in the future. The main tool discussed for 
achieving this were audits. However various practical implementation 
issues regarding those undertaken by companies or third parties were 
highlighted. The possibility of establishing partnerships to work with 
in-country organisations and NGOs also featured in responses which 
considered how to improve purchasing practices and local labour 
conditions:
“As a retailer or as a brand, you can’t contract out all your 
responsibility to a third party and then expect everything to be ok.  
You’ve got to be true to yourself to make sure that everything is 
fine, as well as using that third party as well to support that.”
UK Stakeholder 1
Firms articulated their concerns about both the scope and nature 
of traditional auditing practices. The MSA has encouraged firms to 
audit beyond the first tier of production/supply while at the same time 
adapting audits to include MS and developing additional methods of 
checking compliance:
 “We go beyond audit, because audits only focus on tier 1, 2 or 3 
factories, it doesn’t take you outside to homes... I think the most 
effective beyond audit programme work for us is done through 
NGOs across these organisations….we completely admit that 
we can’t apply blanket standards and blanket programmes in 
ways of working.  We want to work with NGOs and grass roots 
organisations who can advise and guide us what’s in the best 
interest of the workers, obviously operating within a framework 
of legal standards… You also need very skilled auditors who have 
94  Mekong Club (2017) Business Response to Slavery Survey Report 2017. 
the softer skills to really talk to workers and try and understand 
and build up a picture, and also, you know, have that intuitive gut 
feeling, I guess, rather than black and white tick box culture.” UK 
Stakeholder 3
A recent survey of businesses94 found that only 38% of audits in the 
garments sector include reports from local NGOs and/or trade unions 
so while some firms identify this as best-practice it is not yet being 
widely adopted across the sector. 
“We need to take a slightly more differentiated approach to go 
after issues much further upstream. We need to go and look 
elsewhere, apart from Tier 1. We need to have different tools and 
different sorts of assessments. A third party audit is not appropriate 
at farm level and those assessments need to have a much more 
collaborative, a different approach to due diligence. All the 
grocery retailers should get together and try and align on auditing, 
because really this should be taking up less of our time. We should 
be doing the same thing and we should be competing in the areas 
where we can differentiate ourselves, and go beyond compliance. 
We all spend loads of money on audit and kind of secretly know it 
doesn’t work.” UK Stakeholder 4.
Several UK-based businesses expressed some frustration around the 
limits of the auditing process itself and the variety of ways in which it 
can be subverted or manipulated:
 “There’s just so much money in auditing. Audit houses make a 
hell of a lot of money off it so it’s in their interest to develop special 
slightly different audits for everyone.  You start talking about scary 
risk and a lot of brands will go ‘take all my money and make the 
risk go away’. On the other hand, there are issues when companies 
do their own. [A brand] knowing how things work in Dhaka, which 
is that everyone does 80/90 hour weeks, wouldn’t let excessive 
overtime be on their audit. Basically they just don’t want to know, 
because once it’s officially there they’ve got to try and fix it. It’s an 
endemic problem.”  UK Stakeholder 5
Quality of Information on the Supply Chain
Our analysis of MSA statements showed significant differences 
between firms with regard to the volume and quantity of information on 
their own supply chains. The MSA statement analysis had also identified 
this knowledge as being variable when examining actions companies 
listed in order to demonstrate their commitment to identify and avoid 
modern slavery. Statements varied in the level of transparency about 
who their suppliers were and where they were located. Many did not 
address MS risks in the lower tiers of the chain. “Getting to Tier 2 
suppliers is challenging, because you’re relying on the suppliers to 
give you that information and be accurate. I think the further down the 
supply chain you get, the less visibility there is and therefore the risk 
is greater because you don’t know what’s there.” UK Stakeholder 6. 
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The impact of the complexity of supply chains on companies’ ability to 
provide such detail is reflected in the interviews, with mixed views on 
whether full transparency is achievable or necessary:
 “NGOs would like to know where your product is made and to 
have that level of transparency. What we are unsure of is whether 
or not the customer really wants that information and whether or 
not the NGOs need it. I mean, we’ve published our entire factory 
list. So if there were human rights issues in any of those factories, 
the NGOs can contact us, and actually, is it important that we make 
6,000 jeans out there or 100,000 jerseys, I don’t know whether the 
relevance is there. So I mean, it’s something that we would offer 
because we feel like we’ve been pressured to do it, but whether 
the value is there, we’re unsure.” UK Stakeholder 3
Our analysis of MS statements identified that companies selling cocoa 
products, including supermarkets, often did not provide significant 
detail of the cocoa supply chain. This issue was also picked up by 
stakeholders in our interviews, who suggested it was something 
they were aware of and often considered to be a pressing issue with 
associated high risks, but had not yet determined how to address it. 
One interesting observation was regarding the influence of sector-
specific organisations in determining the ability of individual companies 
to have a clear oversight of the entire supply chain: 
 “We choose Rainforest Alliance certified chocolate.  So the buyer 
will just buy from certified source….So we’re not really going down 
to the grower to look for that. I think Rainforest Alliance, they 
do have their registry, but the problem is we would need to ask 
Rainforest Alliance.  We are aware of the ethical considerations 
and human rights abuses and people not being paid properly 
and living in poverty. We just buy from bigger brands as we would 
expect them to do something about it. I don’t think we are doing 
enough, to be honest.” UK Stakeholder 8
When faced with large numbers of complex supply chains, firms are 
focusing on those commodities and geographical territories that they 
consider to be ‘high risk’:
“We know that cocoa is a big issue.  I was out there in the sourcing 
countries myself, spent a lot of time there, but we’ve identified that 
it’s our seasonal chocolate that’s highest risk. Easter eggshells are 
high risk and that’s without any of the damaged brands.  Christmas 
biscuits and Halloween chocolates and the Easter ones are up 
there.” UK Stakeholder 4
There is little empirical evidence of widespread changes to 
procurement decisions based on MS concerns, although a small 
number of firms have made strategic decisions to avoid sourcing 
particular countries and even less have rationalised their supply base 
(to increase control and monitoring of existing suppliers). 
Quality of information on Labour Conditions 
and Workers Experiences
Most MSA statements concentrated on the primary tier of international 
supply chains and to a lesser extent domestically, but did not, or could 
not, address lower tier activity. This is significant, in that it demonstrates 
the absence of oversight over the places within the supply chain 
were the most exploitative practices are likely to occur.  However, 
participants discussed how even considerations of the primary tier 
suppliers’ activities which were most vulnerable to exploitative labour 
practices, such as obligatory overtime, extensive hours, child labour, 
seasonal or casual labour and subcontracting, were not always 
straightforward to address. Issues of local legislation and cultural 
practice dominated the discussion:
“Statistics change all the time, but a third of MPs directly own a 
garment factory or something like that. At the moment I’m trying to 
map out where our garments go [from the factory] to get printed, 
embroidered, wash-dyed. I’ve been to a lot of wash plants and 
some of them are nice and some of them are not. The garments 
go out without our label to get washed and then they come back 
again, but obviously somewhere where we don’t know about, with 
our label in it, so if that place burns down that’s not going to make 
us look good. Another level of risk is panel embroidery…they’ll cut 
the panels in the main factory and send it out, but it won’t have our 
label on again…..The tier below tier 1 is where people who don’t 
ask any questions, have their stuff manufactured, and it’s where 
all our major retailers have stuff manufactured that we don’t know 
about when the top tiers subcontract things that they shouldn’t “ 
UK Stakeholder 5
As many firms start to tackle second, and possibly third, tier suppliers 
they are faced with challenges of how to monitor the procurement and 
sourcing strategies of tier one suppliers and the wider spatial distribution 
of often smaller suppliers in more distant places, including homes. 
 “The whole reason that they [suppliers] farm work out to the 
village is because that’s where the skills are. The labour costs 
are generally a bit lower, as are the costs of living. The majority 
of industry in those villages comes from purely homeworking. So 
with any retailer, and I have to admit that we’re not particularly 
advanced in this, but we are developing our processes, the priority 
would be making sure that the ladies are earning enough to feed, 
house and educate their children. Where you have the risk of child 
labour, it all comes down to wages. If the ladies are not earning 
enough, then it’s inevitable that they would take in additional work 
for children to be engaged in as well, and that stops them from 
being in school, but the children will learn a skill.” UK Stakeholder 3
Discussion with firms would often return to the issue of who is 
responsible for tackling modern slavery through supply chains. Some 
firms felt that they were filling a ‘governance gap’ left by inactive 
national governments:
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“We’ve got what we have to do in terms of respecting workers, but 
the state’s duty is to protect that worker, and, if the state did its role 
to protect that worker, we wouldn’t have to do anything to look at 
our supply chain because they’ve already put that regulation in 
place. People would have a meaningful living wage, people would 
have working protection rights, and access to remedy and the right 
to collective bargaining, that kind of stuff. But in many cases the 
challenge around the world is that the state aren’t doing that, so 
the reliance is on business to then start to protect people as well. 
Supermarkets cannot tell the world how to grow its food or how to 
treat its workers, but if we can be a voice in that, we can start to 
advocate governments to actually do what they should be doing 
anyway.” UK Stakeholder 2
Overall, the interviews we conducted with stakeholders highlighted 
where the legislation can create opportunities to tackle the issue of 
MS but also pointed to barriers to progress. Participants relayed the 
willingness of companies to address MS issues but also showed how 
those individuals tasked with taking the agenda forward were often 
a number of stages removed from the understanding of how workers 
experienced the supply chain on the ground and are reliant on the 
information provided by third parties. However, as they state, many of 
these third parties have a vested interest in the ‘industry’ of auditing, 
certification, inspection and consultancy that the MS agenda has 
inadvertently boosted. Our report now turns to our empirical research in 
cocoa and garments in our case studies to connect the perspective of 
UK-based businesses to working conditions ‘on the ground’ in producer 
countries.  
Connecting working conditions with 
‘transparency’ and modern slavery
We explored how the issues of transparency and modern slavery 
resonated with the struggle for improved working conditions in the four 
case-study countries. Modern slavery and the MSA were not specifically 
mentioned by any worker in either sector in any country. Neither 
were transparency or modern slavery referred to spontaneously in 
the interviews with stakeholders such as trade unions or NGOs – the 
concepts were only discussed once introduced by the interviewer. 
Modern slavery is not a term in common usage in the countries we 
conducted our research, and so there was little connection for our 
participants. This contrasted with other terms around exploitation, in 
particular ‘forced labour’ and ‘child labour’ which were much more 
widely known. 
For example, in the cocoa industry in Ghana and Dominican Republic 
there was a broad understanding of the concept of child labour across 
our participants’ responses, including amongst young workers. In both 
the cocoa-producing countries we conducted fieldwork, international 
pressure has resulted in a rather defensive response to the issue of 
child labour, resulting in a heavy-handed prohibition-style approach, 
95  This was partly a consequence of our research design as we specifically did not set out to ‘follow’ the supply chains of any of the UK companies we interviewed, not least because that would 
have been an additional factor restricting our access to the UK firms. 
which has failed to lead to more constructive, age appropriate 
responses defined by better regulation of work-place conditions for 
children. The result has instead been to exclude them from work, 
thereby limiting their current and future working opportunities.  In the 
garment industries of Myanmar and Bangladesh, issues around forced 
or child labour were more likely to be articulated by labour activist 
unions and NGOs using terms such a ‘worker rights’ and ‘worker 
exploitation’ than by workers themselves. In both sectors, however, 
workers did not always articulate their experiences as abuse, often 
citing their situation or experience to be the ‘norm’.
Interestingly, when we asked our participants about transparency, and 
how this related to international brands, their responses related to the 
quality of production and finished goods rather than the experience 
of the workforce in producing them. Therefore, it was not possible for 
us to draw together a common narrative regarding the transparency 
agenda as understood by UK stakeholders or those representing 
international business interests and the experiences of workers in the 
supply chain during our interviews.95 
Moreover, we found a striking absence of transparency related to 
supply chains from the workers’ perspective. Our participants had 
little or no knowledge about where products from the factories and 
farms end up. In the case of garments, for example, we are aware that 
companies such as Tesco, H&M, C&A and Next procure garments from 
the districts where the factories are located and where the workers 
interviewed are, or have been, employed. For cocoa, that Nestle, 
Mondolez, Green and Blacks, Divine and Cargill procure produce 
from the areas we visited in Ghana and Dominican Republic. Yet, 
workers, when questioned, were vague or unsure of the brand or final 
destination of the materials they were involved in producing (although 
they were aware that the goods were for export). 
Cocoa Case Studies 
As can be seen in Figure 2 above, there are a lot of opportunities for 
oversight of labour conditions in the production of cocoa in Ghana. 
From the formal structure/processes for cocoa, to the chief farmers in 
local community governing structures to Licenced Buying Companies 
(LBC) field officers and regional child protection committees on the 
ground. In each case, however, they do not seem to be utilised for this 
purpose, but rather only for the purpose of product quality. 
It is unclear how LBCs and PBCs (Produce Buying Companies) make 
their income in a fixed price economy. These companies buy the cocoa 
from farmers in at 475 GHS per bag, although farmers often claimed 
to be unsure of the accuracy of their weighing machines. LBCs report 
good relationships with chocolate companies; they act to enable 
these companies to attain certification and invest in farming and social 
infrastructure (such as schools, canteens, farming techniques, mapping 
farms to enable accurate understanding of size and thus purchasing 
of amounts of fertiliser). However, the extent of financial benefit for 
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the LBCs from this relationship may shape their view. Farmers are, 
according to LBCs, sometimes involved in LBC/PBC as stakeholders. 
This gives a cooperative style approach but also presents a challenge 
regarding investigating or reporting on their own practice as employers 
of labourers. In short, the primary interest of these entities is to produce 
good quality cocoa and make profit. The government interests are 
understandably to sustain this as they depend on cocoa as major 
source of income for the economy. They buy the cocoa from LBCs and 
PBCs in cedis (GHS) and sell to chocolate companies and others in US 
dollars.
In DR, we were often told that farmers organisations have increased 
benefits to farmers and to have helped with improving transparency. 
However, this view was not always shared by all farmers:
“Conacado was created with the intention of helping small-scale 
producers. At the start, it was an NGO. After that, it went through a 
number of changes. We do not see all of these changes as being 
overly beneficial for all the producers...Remunerations are not 
being passed onto the producers. That completely transformed the 
infrastructure. This change was negative. The work was easier. The 
producers were not under so much pressure. They used to worry a 
lot about ensuring they were complying with the norms, that they 
were not using agrochemicals, that there were no plastics on the 
farm. They received the information and tried to multiply these 
effects. They tried to pass this onto their families – how to carry out 
and improve production. What we’re seeing at the moment is that 
there is no difference. The companies want the same high-quality 
cocoa but the producer is not seeing the benefits of this. They are 
living worse. They are not seeing real benefits of their efforts”. DR 
FG1213
There is a new practice of LBCs contracting farmers to preclude them 
from selling their cocoa to any other LBC, which limits farmers choices 
in relation to accessing the benefits provided by some chocolate 
companies, but in theory, means it may be possible to trace which farms 
supply which chocolate companies. On the face of it then, Ghana has a 
robust process of supply chain ‘traceability’ from farm to company. The 
sacks provided by government which are used to transport the beans 
have a signifier which denotes the region of origin, this will then reveal 
the LBCs operating in that area and the farms they purchase from. 
[PHOTO]
We found that farmers in both countries were motivated by how 
certification could attract a premium for their produce, and this was 
confirmed by interviews with stakeholders and farmers. There are 
now 3 standards for cocoa beans – the newly merged Rainforest 
Alliance/ UTZ, Fairtrade and organic. ILO and UNSDG standards on 
labour conditions seems to be having an impact on how companies are 
developing standards which farmers are expected to meet for certain 
certifications; for example UTZ/RA ‘Block C’ standards concentrate 
on workers’ rights, including ‘worst forms of child labour’. However, in 
our research we found that the operational focus is on the quality of 
beans, for meeting both customers and buyers demands to know the 
provenance of the beans, and maximisation of profits. 
The infrastructure for quality control and compliance with certification 
standards for cocoa farming seems very much focussed on the quality 
of the cocoa, to a lesser extent the environmental impact (deforestation 
and mining) and even less concerned with workers experiences in 
producing it. 
Where workers’ rights are discussed in Ghana and DR, child labour 
dominates discussions but more as an historical, rather than a 
contemporary, issue. The ILO perspective of children whose parents are 
in a situation of forced labour also being counted as victims of forced 
labour, are not considered. There is no recognition of wider issues 
of labour rights. Labourers do not have any form of formal redress or 
mediation with farmers. The only unions referred to are for farmers 
and especially in Ghana, farmers did not have high opinions of their 
organisation or impact:
 “I do not belong to any workers union or cooperatives now. 
From my observations in this community, the leaders of such 
unions or cooperatives take advantage and squander monetary 
contributions.  I therefore do not trust them to join any union.” GH 
W16
There is acknowledgement that chocolate companies may eventually 
only buy certified cocoa in the future. In DR, farmers spoke of the EU 
move to use exclusively Fairtrade and organic cocoa in next few years. 
Thus it is in companies’ best interests to help farmers achieve these 
standards, but in DR this is not without its problems:
 “From 2025 the EU is not going to import non-certified cocoa. 
But 95% of the plantations where they are trying to introduce 
this are plantations that use agrochemicals. Who is going to buy 
these products? In the EU there will always be a market for cocoa 
but we see that they are not producing this with the same quality 
that is needed. This is because they say it is very expensive and 
the producers are not earning enough to ensure this level of 
maintenance.” DR FG1213
“Fair Trade, UTZ, Rainforest, we have done everything they have 
asked of us. And now they are saying that they want more. We did 
everything and now the EU is saying it doesn’t want Cadmium, it 
doesn’t want pesticides, they permanently change the norms, they 
change the environment. The European consumer has to know 
this. We have put all of our eggs into Europe’s basket. We have met 
every requirement. We predict that there won’t be the sufficient 
labour force but also that Europe does not want to pay what they 
have to pay.” DR S13
Ghana’s Cocobod provides Government oversight and control of 
quality, sales and processing. This structure has its advantages, but as 
a whole farming (labourers and farmers) seem to be distanced from 
the profit that others make in this supply chain. If there was greater 
transparency around the profit margin for farmers (the difference 
between the cost to produce cocoa and the price paid), research could 
28  |  Clothes, Chocolate and Children: Realising the Transparency Dividend
establish if farmers are experiencing exploitative conditions. Such 
transparency would also serve to highlight the extent of the difference 
between farmers’ profits and those of international companies. 
Government and companies are reported in both countries to 
provide some support, albeit with concerns about their shortcomings. 
The economic impact on farmers who need to invest in resources 
to achieve the standards is nonetheless clear in their accounts. 
Certification processes, despite all of the problems, however present 
an opportunity for companies to addresses social, environmental and 
economic issues and effect change on working conditions that have 
not yet been fully realised.
Garment Case Studies 
As Figure 1 shows, the distribution of value capture in the global value 
chain is highly even across production stages.  However, our project 
also demonstrated that there is unevenness within stages also.  There 
is variation in the different kinds of factories that supply clothing. In 
the case of Bangladesh, these can be split into three categories. First, 
there are ‘compliant’ factories primarily serving the export market, 
where wages are highest, some unionisation and attention paid to 
health and safety. Second, there are factories focused on domestic 
demand that are not compliant and are neglected by government 
inspectors, and where there are lower wages and less concerns about 
health and safety. Finally, there are small factories that are doing 
subcontracting work for factories above. These are often in older 
buildings, characterised by poor health and safety, and offer temporary 
or seasonal employment. It is in this final category where child labour is 
more likely to be an issue, alongside ancillary and support services that 
surround factory production: transport, shops, handmade cigarettes, 
stitching, embroidery (likely home-based), where employment can start 
as young as 6 years old. 
A key risk for foreign buyers seeking to improve transparency is the 
practice of subcontracting by the compliant factories. We found efforts 
to mitigate this (often by insisting on reporting systems, or the vetting of 
subcontractors) but found little evidence to suggest that brands could 
be confident about what kinds of subcontracting were occurring. For 
example, factory owners tend to have multiple factories but will always 
take government of private inspectors to visit the same one, which will 
naturally be the most compliant. This makes it difficult to know how 
many factories there are in any given area, and while there is licensing 
for garment factories, many of the smaller factories are not licensed. 
In contrast to the relatively more mature Bangladeshi garment sector, 
transparency is not a word readily associated with the Myanmar 
garment sector and its growing number of factories and workers. Even 
with our research team of experienced activists and ex-workers we 
found it challenging to establish the chain of supply to the brands. One 
of the features of our interviews with workers was a lack of knowledge 
about the end-point or destination of the factory’s outputs. There was 
a telling comment from an international buyer about their reluctance 
to put a logo or any branding on the factory where clothes are made, 
citing the complexity and dynamism of production patterns as making 
this ‘unrealistic’.
“Most of the factories are run by local people, but they are actually 
owned and operated from places like [South] Korea or Hong Kong, 
and they are very secretive about the brands they are working for 
and because of sub-contracting it is very difficult to know who they 
are working for. The trade organisation UFFCCI – always have a 
small share in each business – they are normally ex-military.” Mya 
S08
A significant part of our discussions with stakeholders revolved around 
the poor state of industrial relations, which were widely perceived 
as fragile. There was widespread disillusionment about how well the 
new unions were operating and coping with grievances. We were 
repeatedly told that the outcomes of complaints and appeals processes 
did not result in proper redress, and employers could avoid complying 
by simply paying a fine. 
There was little evidence that foreign buyers could penetrate much 
beyond the standard factory visits, meaning that second-tier suppliers 
were a significant unknown. All our stakeholders confirmed that 
there were a number of smaller operations where work might be 
outsourced, and that these would mainly be staffed by older workers, 
and they accepted that there would be greater risks of exploitation in 
these operations. As with Bangladesh, we were provided with lots of 
anecdotal evidence that the audit process is manipulated or faked. 
Summary
In both of the sectors we examined, we found an almost complete 
disconnect between ‘brands’ and workers. As previous research has 
underlined the opportunities for building a relationship, for example 
through inspections or audits, tend to be lost due to the overwhelming 
focus on product quality rather than workers and their experiences. 
We found this was exacerbated by a reliance by companies on third 
parties to assure UK-based operators of the absence of modern slavery. 
Their focus is on the quality of the product and the price it can achieve, 
rather than the labour experience of workers in the supply chain. The 
assurances that certification schemes provide, for example that no child 
labour is used in the production process, as will be later explained, 
cannot be guaranteed. 
This indicates that transparency is only operating in one direction. To 
reap the potential benefits of supply chain transparency, it needs to 
hand more power to the workers at the bottom of the chain to hold 
the brands to account. When NGOs/academics have pointed out the 
potential of transparency to enable worker organising across nodes of 
supply chains or to hold brands to account, they are implicitly assuming 
that those workers will have access to this information. If they do not, 
that route to change is denied.
Among the many challenges in establishing the added value of supply 
chain transparency requirements under the MSA for working conditions 
is the wide variety of interpretations regarding what constitutes ‘the 
supply chain’ in addition to different understandings of what constitutes 
‘modern slavery’ (MS). 
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The transnational nature of production means that supply chains are 
now ‘ubiquitous in the global economy, found in every industry, and on 
every continent’.96 Our research confirms that poor working conditions 
are the norm in supply chains for garments and cocoa cultivation in 
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Ghana and the Dominican Republic, and that 
these more acutely impact precarious workers, women and children 
and their families.
Does the obligation to be transparent about action taken to address 
slavery in supply chains, bring about practical and meaningful changes 
to business operations? How far does the transparency obligation 
extend through the supply chain? This report has highlighted the scale 
of the challenge for the transparency requirements introduced under 
the MSA to make any appreciable difference for workers, children and 
families in supply chains. There are two initial observations: 
• Most definitions of MS refer to severe and criminal forms of labour 
exploitation. Focussing on these forms may however obscure other 
bad labour practices from our vision. As FLEX (Focus on Labour 
Exploitation) have pointed out, in the continuum from ‘labour 
compliance to exploitation’ many practices and experiences are the 
abuses ‘in-between’97. 
• Evidence suggests that illegal activities involving MS are often 
connected to legally produced products and services in the 
private sector through certain informality and business models, 
including the use of low-cost and flexible labour; outsourcing and 
subcontracting and long, complex supply chains98. Therefore, 
making supply chains more ‘transparent’ may prove central to 
tackling labour abuses. 
Therefore, if transparency in supply chains is to play a role in 
eradicating MS and child labour, as outlined in the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG 8.7), businesses need to understand, report 
- and respond to – a wide range of abusive and exploitative forms of 
employment as they affect workers, children and their families. In other 
words, for its transformative potential to be realised, transparency must 
be more than simply increasing the availability of accurate information 
about which suppliers they are working with; it must become an 
instrument to improve accountability through the identification and 
tracing of negative consequences of practices within supply chains as 
part of efforts to address causal factors.99 
96  Ruggie, J. Just business: Multinational corporations and human rights (2013) (New York: WW Norton & Company), 6.
97  Labour Compliance to Exploitation and the Abuses Inbetween, FLEX 2016
98  Allain et al 2013
99  Egels-Zanden and Hansson, 2016
This research project was designed with the purpose of creating 
findings that would be policy-relevant, so we finish by outlining key 
recommendations. While we are confident that the research was 
conducted in a sensitive and informed manner and generated evidence 
that adds to our understanding of working conditions in cocoa 
cultivation and garment manufacturing, we accept that our approach 
has some limitations. The experiences that we collated are context-
specific and may be more reflective of those organisations or factories 
that have been suggested or recommended by others. The number 
of participants in the research was relatively high, but this was spread 
across four countries, and the sample constitute an indicative, rather 
than representative, sample. However, the data that has been captured 
is insightful and illuminates the practices and experiences within the 
garment supply chain in a particular time and place that require further 
consideration in relation to the issues of transparency and modern 
slavery in UK policy and practice.
The risk of modern slavery 
While we did not actively search for examples of modern slavery, we 
can provide evidence of practices and experiences that could make it 
more likely for exploitation to occur. These were different in each sector 
and location, but there were some common themes and issues across 
all case studies. 
• We found that compensation for employment was underneath 
the levels recommended for each sector (e.g. the ‘living income’ 
(Cocoa Barometer, 2018) or living wage (Fair Wear Foundation, 
2016). Without addressing this supply chains are better described 
as ‘poverty chains’ (Selwyn, 2018) where companies seeking profits 
simply reinforce existing structural inequalities and do nothing to 
alleviate poverty.
• Key issues here were deductions in pay, non-payment of overtime, 
low pay (under minimum wage), and state involvement (too much or 
too little enforcement)
• There were a range of issues around the ‘disciplining’ of workers 
which varied in terms of method, but were common across our four 
countries, e.g. the role of the state and intervention in family life 
(child labour and farmers), industrial police (Bangladesh) and CCTV 
(Ba and Myanmar)
• We found a range of adverse impacts on workers, children and 
their families from labour laws (e.g. child labour, achieving gender 
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balance in workforce displaces women and children into riskier 
work) or non-compliance etc, use of intermediaries by companies to 
ensure their obligations are met without engagement with workers.
Risks in the garments sector:
• A masculinisation of the sector, with women being pushed into 
lower-grade occupations and male worker participants working in 
male dominated factories
• Issue for older workers being forced out of the workplace and 
replaced by cheaper, faster younger labour. Linked to productivity 
levels required for orders and labour law changes to minimum 
wage. Younger workers said to be in lower (invisible) job roles or 
used clandestinely.
• A common practice whereby overtime is non-voluntary, essential 
to meet orders – with evidence that buyers are not considering the 
impacts of their demands on the workforce
• A lack of training or equipment: we heard about workers having to 
watch others to learn or depending on others in their community to 
enable them to do their work
• We heard about numerous examples where employers were able 
to mislead brands and manipulate worker responses when visits or 
audits take place
• We did not encounter widespread evidence that workers were 
paying to be recruited, but there were still issues identified around 
the use of ‘agents’ 
• Deductions are commonplace but not explained (payslips or 
contracts) –this significantly reduces the level of wages which can 
appear reasonable (to buyers)
• Workers want more UK state involvement in legislation and 
regulation but owners say buyers are most powerful actor.
• Differentiation, and widening gap, between the conditions of export 
and import factories.  Government monitoring of the latter is much 
weaker and the domestic and subcontracting factories are high 
risk. 
Risks in the cocoa sector:
• A key problem we found was that of low prices. With buyer prices 
low farmers are often forced to involve all of their family in the work 
involved to produce cocoa. They told us that paid labour was too 
expensive and profit margins were very tight, sometimes due to 
requirements around certification
• The focus on child labour in the past means that children below 18 
have become totally excluded from paid work on farms. While this 
may be seen as some as a success, our evidence from NGO’s and 
workers suggests that this means those children have been pushed 
into work in riskier sectors and industries e.g. mining, sex work, 
street work
• We also found that children are involved in the production and 
sales of other plants grown alongside cocoa (e.g. cassava, plantain, 
bananas) to subsidise family income.
• Overall, we found a dangerous complacency around child labour, 
100  Mantouvalou, V. ‘The UK’s Modern Slavery Act 2015 Three Years On’ (2018) 81(6) Modern Law Review, 1017-1045 at p.1038.
with chocolate companies appearing to delegate their (UK) legal 
responsibilities to local (profit making) agencies without adequate 
direction or investment on the issues such as modern slavery. In 
the case of child labour, regional committees can only act when 
someone reports a concern, but this is unlikely to happen if local 
communities depend on the income this sector generates. There 
are others issues around the displacement of child labour to other 
areas and sectors 
• New uses of cocoa (e.g. beauty products) while potentially good 
news for the sector can also increase risks for exploitation. This is 
because existing priorities and infrastructure concentrate on cocoa 
for chocolate production, meaning other production is unregulated 
and therefore vulnerable to the use of exploitative practice. This 
may be an area of interest for future research on the sector.
• Employment relations are generally informal, and operate on the 
basis of the cash economy, making workers/labourers vulnerable 
to robbery, and meaning that it is difficult to calculate contracted 
hours/overtime, especially considering home and work are one and 
the same for many labourers and farmers
• There is a labour supply issue which has risks for exploitative 
practices to worsen due to ageing amongst the population of 
farmers – this is linked to a lack of livelihood education or interest 
in cocoa cultivation for young people. Livelihood education for local 
population is ignored in favour of formal education, even though 
employment scarcity exists. Enforced school attendance has 
consequences for families e.g. fees, uniform, no home working.
• Farmers are treated as the workers in traditional chocolate 
companies supply chain, but they can also be employers - 
‘sharecroppers’ or labourers are largely ignored. These groups are 
suffering from poor working conditions (although we found that 
experiences are marginally better for DR labourers). There are also 
a range of complex issues around land titles, land inheritance and 
forfeiture 
• Governance of cocoa production sales, similarly in both countries 
what began as NGO and cooperatives have been co-opted as 
private entity companies and this also means that the different 
pricing systems (fixed – Ghana, variable - DR) presents different 
advantages and disadvantages
• Certification schemes have successfully incorporated many actors 
in the sector (e.g. FLO in DR and CPC in GH) but farmers do not 
have a voice in these systems, and we found an overwhelming 
focus on product quality rather than labour conditions 
Conclusions
Our findings suggest that the new legal requirement to produce a 
statement under the MSA has not transformed what has historically 
been a soft law commitment to transparency. It has not, as Mantouvalou 
has argued: pierced the ‘corporate veil’100. Our research clearly 
demonstrates the urgent need for the transparency requirement to be 
extended beyond the first tier of supply chains. As our dialogue with 
firms and stakeholders illustrated, this challenging. 
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One advantage of the ‘modern slavery’ frame For the companies 
we spoke to was that it helped them to explain today investors and 
management the reasons why they should improve their sustainability 
practices (i.e. to eradicate slavery) in a way that talking about general 
Labour abuse is did not. However, a disadvantage is that the term 
modern slavery does not resonate with stakeholders or workers in 
the countries we conducted research. Discussing ‘slavery’ rather than 
general working conditions risks diverting attention from lesser forms of 
exploitation, and the importance of contextual issues around family life 
or gender.
It remains to be seen whether the Modern Slavery agenda will continue 
the trend of short-term approaches to unsustainable labour practices 
in these sectors. This has been seen in the past with funding to deal 
with child labour, for example, that has failed to address root causes 
around poverty and land ownership. Our research would suggest 
that expectations for local monitoring systems undertaken by NGO’s 
and others to uncover and/or address risks of modern slavery are 
inappropriate and unrealistic due to lack of common understanding of 
the problem itself, and the lack of resources or capacity to do so.
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Appendix A - CCC Project 
Objectives
I. Map and analyse concerns around exploitation in four low and 
middle-income countries in production networks relating to cocoa 
and garments
II. Explore how business and worker groups are responding to the 
transparency in supply chains agenda in the UK, and how this 
impacts on workers in those countries 
III. Examine the (competing) children’s rights arguments and 
experiences underpinning the UK’s modern slavery agenda and 
compare these with those countries where children may make up a 
significant portion of the workforce
IV. Identify and evaluate the different systems of supply chain 
operation and business organisation which exist in these 
production networks
V. Generate recommendations for the development and modification 
of transparency measures in the light of the findings
Research questions:
a) How do experiences/levels of exploitation vary according to the 
profiles of workers, especially child workers, the demographic 
and industry context? In what ways can this knowledge and the 
experiences of workers be used to improve understanding and 
practice of supply chain ethics?
b) What factors influence the resilience and vulnerability 
of particular supply chains to different forms of labour 
exploitation?
c) What factors have influenced the effectiveness of particular 
interventions and/or models of governance in promoting labour 
rights? What practical policy recommendations can be drawn 
from the case studies presented?
101  Note that Bangladesh and Myanmar have not ratified Convention No. 138. 
102  Ghana, Dominican Republic, Myanmar and Bangladesh have all ratified ILO Convention 182.
Appendix B - International 
Child Labour Law
The international and European regulatory framework relating to child 
labour and children’s working conditions is captured in the following 
instruments: 
• The International Labour Organisation Convention No. 138 on the 
minimum age for admission to employment and work (1973): sets 
general minimum age for admission to employment or work at 15 
years (13 for light work) and the minimum age for hazardous work at 
18 (16 under certain strict conditions). It provides for the possibility 
of initially setting the general minimum age at 14 (12 for light work) 
where the economy and educational facilities are insufficiently 
developed.101 
• The International Labour Organisation Convention No. 182 on 
the worst forms of child labour, 1999102: Attempts to make a 
more nuanced distinctions between the different circumstances in 
which children work, with a particular focus on the worst forms of 
child labour. Requires ratifying States to eliminate the worst forms 
of child labour in all its guises including slavery, child trafficking, 
debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, 
the recruitment of children into armed conflict, child prostitution, 
pornography and drug trafficking; and any other work which is likely 
to harm the health, safety or morals of children. Most would not 
dispute the importance of eliminating these forms of exploitative 
and damaging child labour, but there remain some problems of 
defining precisely which types of work fit within the scope of this 
Convention or of how best to ensure that intervention improves the 
welfare of marginalized children.
 It will still be necessary to determine whether, based on the facts 
of the case, the children in question are being exploited in such a 
way as to constitute slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory 
labour or human trafficking. For example, it is possible for children 
to undertake some ‘light work’ which would not necessarily 
constitute modern slavery. ‘Light work’ is defined by article 7 of 
ILO Convention No. 138. Children do have particular vulnerabilities 
which should be considered when determining whether modern 
slavery is taking place. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 specifically 
recognises that it is not necessary for a child to have been forced, 
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threatened or deceived into their situation for it to be defined as 
exploitation. 
 The worst forms of child labour are very likely to constitute modern 
slavery under the terms of the MSA 2015. The worst forms of child 
labour are defined by article 3 of ILO Convention No. 182 to include  
forced or compulsory labour and work which, by its nature or the 
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, 
safety or morals of children.
Appendix C – Overseas 
Participant Breakdown
Over the period of June to December 2018, 265 workers and 
stakeholders, including NGO’s, trade unions and civil society, were 
interviewed about their experiences of work in the cocoa and garment 
industry (between 214 worker and 51 stakeholder interviews). 104 in the 
garment sector of Myanmar and Bangladesh, primarily in the districts 
of Dhaka and Yangon, and 153 in the cocoa sector of Ghana and 
Dominican Republic. 
Participants did not always want to disclose their demographic 
information – age, sex, marital status, and therefore information is 
incomplete. 126 participants did not disclose their sex.  Of those that 
did, 53 were men, 86 women. Age breakdown is shown in Figure A. 
Figure A:  age breakdown of interviewees. 
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